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ABSTRACT  
   
This paper examines how equity analysts' roles as information 
intermediaries and monitors affect corporate liquidity policy and its associated 
value of cash, providing new evidence that analysts have a direct impact on 
corporate liquidity policy. Greater analyst coverage (1) reduces information 
asymmetry between a firm and outside shareholders and (2) enhances the 
monitoring process. Consistent with these arguments, analyst coverage increases 
the value of cash, thereby allowing firms to hold more cash. The cash-to-assets 
ratio increases by 5.2 percentage points when moving from the bottom analyst-
coverage decile to the top decile. The marginal value of $1 of corporate cash 
holdings is $0.93 for the bottom analyst-coverage decile and $1.83 for the top 
decile. The positive effects remain robust after a battery of endogeneity checks.  I 
also perform tests employing a unique dataset that consists of public and private 
firms, as well as a dataset that consists of public firms that have gone private. A 
public firm with analyst coverage can hold approximately 8% more cash than its 
private counterpart. These findings constitute new evidence on the real effect of 
analyst coverage. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior studies have established the role of equity analysts as information 
intermediaries and as monitors.  Papers related to the role of information 
intermediaries examine the effect of information content on stock performance.  
With respect to the monitoring view, the existing literature mainly focuses on the 
relation between earnings management activities and analyst coverage.  Cash 
holdings by US companies have generated plentiful attention from academia, 
professionals, and the media over time.  The driving force behind the considerable 
attention on cash holdings is the liquid feature of cash.  With noticeable increase 
of cash holdings in corporations over the past two decades, the liquid feature of 
cash is subject to significant information asymmetry and potential agency costs.  
The information intermediary and monitoring functions of analysts can reduce 
information asymmetry and possible agency conflicts between a manager and 
outside shareholders, respectively.  This paper examines the direct impact of 
analysts on corporate cash policy and its associated value of cash. 
Endogeneity represents a first-order impediment when research involves 
analyst activities, and it may cause regression estimates to be biased.  This paper 
addresses this endogeneity concern through a variety of different rigorous 
techniques.  Following standard convention, this paper first uses a two-stage least 
squares method with the industry median number of analysts as the instrument, 
and a lagged-value method to address the concern of endogeneity.  This paper 
also examines the effect of change in analyst coverage on change in corporate 
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cash holdings, while applying the two-stage least squares approach to study the 
time-series effect of analysts.  In addition, this paper incorporates the experiment 
of the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on analysts’ activities as an 
alternative way to take account of endogeneity.  To further substantiate the 
robustness of the results, I explore the benefit and economic significance of the 
influence of analyst coverage on public firms’ cash policy by employing a unique 
dataset comprised of a set of public and private firms.  In addition, I undertake a 
novel experiment that examines cash policy before and after public firms go 
private.  All else being equal, given a company’s status, private firms, including 
those that were public at one time, have no analyst coverage.  The clear identity of 
public and private firms gives us a distinct setting in which to examine the effects 
of information and monitoring on corporate cash holdings. 
Analysts have been recognized as both information intermediaries and 
monitors.  Through their professional training and dedication to information 
gathering, analysts accumulate relevant financial and operational information and 
distill the information content of financial statements and operational decisions.  
Analysts also closely follow a firm and interact with management on various 
occasions, raising questions regarding the firm’s financial performance, 
operations and future prospects.  On the one hand, their skills and experience 
allow analysts to uncover major corporate frauds (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales, 
2008).  Empirical evidence from testing the magnitude of earnings management 
with different levels of analyst coverage supports the governance view of analysts.  
 3 
Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate security analysts can serve as 
monitors in helping align the interests of managers and shareholders.   
On the other hand, analysts’ primary responsibility is to generate profits 
for their brokerage houses through information distribution such as issuing 
research reports and making earnings forecasts or recommendations to the market.  
The literature has found evidence regarding the influence of analysts’ reports on 
stock price (e.g., Schipper, 1991; Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979; and Womack, 
1996).  The information distribution improves the credibility of management 
disclosure and investor informedness (Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia, 1995; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001).  Empirical evidence from Chung and Jo (1996) suggests 
R&D, advertising, and Tobin’s Q increase with the number of analysts following 
the firm.  More importantly, Chung and Jo further suggest analysts are an 
important channel through which the information regarding R&D and advertising 
is incorporated into firm value.  A comprehensive survey by Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005) shows CFOs consider meeting analysts’ benchmarks one of their 
major tasks.  CFOs might be willing to trade off long-term sustainability for a 
short-term external earnings target.  CFOs further argue that meeting the earnings 
target reduces investors’ uncertainty regarding firms’ future prospects, which 
creates credibility and maintains the stock price.  Based on the analyses from the 
survey, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) conclude that analysts are one of 
the most important groups in setting stock price.  The evidence on monitoring and 
information intermediary functions of analysts suggests analysts serve as a value-
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enhancing driver for firms.  Studies and news articles1 focusing on the negative 
side of analysts have argued that the excessive pressure security analysts create 
could weaken analysts’ value-creation activities for the firm (Fuller and Jensen, 
2010; Chapman and Steenburgh, 2011).  Analysts’ conflicts of interests and 
career advancement might partially reduce the speed and accuracy of information 
reaching the market.2  The conflicting statements regarding the influence of 
analysts’ activities from previous work raise questions about the net effect of 
analysts on the firm.  More importantly, the literature has not thoroughly 
discussed how analysts affect corporate policies and their associated value to 
shareholders.3   
Corporate cash policy seems to be an ideal laboratory for answering these 
questions.  As opposed to external financing, cash gives a firm flexibility without 
releasing much critical information to the market.  Cash policy is mostly liquid in 
that managers can either choose to disgorge cash to shareholders or use it for 
internal or external organization expansion.  The flexibility associated with cash is 
related to considerable information asymmetry and its associated potential agency 
concerns.  Numerous media have also documented that firms have been building 
                                                 
1
 See Browning, E.S, “The Downside of Optimism on Earnings,” Wall Street 
Journal, April 12, 2010 
 
2
 Relative works, for example, include Michaely and Womack (1999), O’Brien, 
McNichols, and Lin (2005), Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007), and Hong and 
Kubik (2003).    
 
3
 Derrien and Kecskés (2010) study the impact of a decrease in analyst coverage 
on corporate investment, financing, and payout policies.  Yet they do not address 
the impact of these policies on firm valuation. 
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up cash reserves.4  The increase in cash holdings can exacerbate the information 
asymmetry and potential agency concerns resulting from the liquid nature of cash.   
Agency theory predicts cash may increase a manager’s discretion and 
reduce the scrutiny from the capital market, both of which prove to be even more 
critical when cash represents a non-negligible amount to corporate capital.  Hence 
the potential conflict between managers and outside shareholders tends to be 
profound under this setting.  As Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose, due to the 
separation of ownership and control, self-interested managers could pursue their 
own interests or spend cash on organizational inefficiencies at the expense of 
shareholders.  Empirical evidence consistent with the agency costs of cash 
includes Harford (1999) who finds that cash-rich firms are more likely to make 
value-decreasing acquisitions.  Thus analysts serve as one of the external 
monitoring mechanisms on behalf of outside shareholders through closely 
following and analyzing a company’s allocation of cash reserves.  The monitoring 
mechanism of analysts enhances the alignment of interests between managers and 
outside shareholders and prevents managers from inefficient usage of cash.5  It 
                                                 
4
 For example, Non-financial firms hold $1.93 trillion in cash and other liquid 
assets as of September 2010, and these cash holdings account for 7.4% of total 
assets, the largest share since 1959 (LaHart, Justin, “Companies Cling to Cash—
Coffers Swell to 51-year High as Cautious Firms Put Off Investing in Growth,” 
Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2010; see also McGinty, Tom, and Cari Tuna, 
“Jittery Companies Stash Cash—After Crisis, Big Businesses Hoard Most Bucks 
in 40 Years; Google's $22 Billion Cache” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 
2009). 
 
5
 See Barry and Brown (1984) for a differential information model based on the 
quality of information across securities. 
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also predicts a positive relation between analyst coverage and corporate cash 
holdings.  
Alternatively, companies may hold cash for legitimate reasons.  Bates, 
Kahle, and Stulz (2009) find precautionary motives largely explain the non-
negligible increase in cash holdings from 1980 to 2006.  Mikkelson and Partch 
(2003) examine companies with extreme amounts of cash holdings and find these 
sample companies do not underperform relative to their peers.  Based on a 
theoretical framework, Morellec and Nikolov (2009) show that under intense 
market competition when companies are financially constrained, cash holdings 
can be a buffer against the unexpected operating loss and provide a refuge from 
inefficient closure.  However, in a world with incomplete information and 
investors’ reactions depending on the nature of information and speed at which it 
evolves, misevaluation may persist for a considerable period.  Correspondingly, 
due to the liquid nature of cash and the considerable amount held by firms over 
time, it can generate considerable information asymmetry and uncertainty among 
investors about the factors that drive the phenomenon.    
Information asymmetry leads to investors valuing firms at a discount.  
Merton (1987) shows that if investors only have a subset of information and their 
portfolio selection is based on the knowledge about a certain security, they will 
undervalue the security due to different distributions of information among 
investors.  This finding is especially true if the cost to gather, examine, and 
distribute the information is potentially high.  The analyst’s role as information 
intermediary increases firm value by largely reducing information asymmetry and 
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enhancing the recognition of investors, who rely on analysts collecting and 
disseminating firms’ public and private information, evaluating corporate 
performance, and making recommendations.6  Further, to the extent that lower 
information asymmetry reduces the cost of capital, the reduced cost of capital can 
help managers accumulate precautionary cash reserves through access to the 
external capital market.  Taken together, these arguments suggest a positive 
relation between analyst coverage and corporate cash holdings.7  Otherwise, 
managers conveying information by taking different actions, such as distributing 
cash, may be optimal for the company.  Fayele (2004) argues that because of 
concerns about agency conflict possibly resulting from information asymmetry, 
holding more cash will lead to a higher likelihood of a proxy fight as well as 
subsequent executive turnover.   
In this paper, I first examine how analyst coverage affects corporate cash 
policy.  I hypothesize that greater analyst coverage reduces information 
asymmetry and enhances monitoring.  Reduced information asymmetry and 
enhanced monitoring increase the value of cash holdings.  According to the trade-
off model, firms will increase cash holdings because the benefits outweigh the 
costs of holding cash. To disentangle how information and monitoring effects 
contribute to the positive relation between analyst coverage and cash holdings, I 
                                                 
6
 See also Brennan and Hughes (1991), Brennan et al. (1993), and Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1995). 
 
7
 Reduced information asymmetry could lead to a decrease in financial constraints.  
This suggests firms may hold less cash as they can easily visit the market when 
they need cash.  However, how likely this will affect firm’s cash holdings is an 
empirical question. 
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follow Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model to study how the change in 
corporate cash holdings results in a change in corporate market valuation.  This 
model helps us verify the information intermediary and monitoring functions of 
analysts from shareholders’ standpoint. 
To construct the data, I take analyst information from Thomson Reuters 
I/B/E/S Detail History file.  I then merge the data with CRSP and Compustat data.  
The final sample covers a total of 94,636 firm-year observations from 1984 to 
2009.  I follow Bates, Kahle, and Stulz’s (2009) methodology to study the 
relationship between cash holdings and analyst coverage.  The results show cash 
holdings increase with analyst coverage.  When moving from the lowest to the 
highest analyst coverage decile, the cash-to-assets ratio increases by 0.052 or 
roughly 31% of the sample mean of cash holdings.  The evidence survives under 
various model specifications and suggests analysts play a critical role as 
information intermediaries and monitors when managers determine the liquidity 
policy.   
I apply the approach by Faulkender and Wang (2006), who estimate the 
marginal value of a dollar in cash in the view of shareholders, through 
investigating the marginal value of cash interacted with analyst coverage.  Ideally, 
if analysts’ information intermediary and monitoring functions have value, the 
marginal value of an additional dollar amount of cash should increase with analyst 
coverage.  The regression estimation suggests analysts have an economically 
significant positive effect on how shareholders value the additional amount of 
cash a firm holds.  Moving from lowest coverage to the highest-coverage decile, 
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the value of an additional dollar of cash is worth 90 cents more. The evidence 
confirms that overall analysts’ activities are value-enhancing to the firm.  The 
results are robust after controlling for institutional ownership holdings and the 
managerial entrenchment index.  More importantly, I find the positive impact to 
the marginal value of cash is consistent with the roles of information 
intermediaries and monitors under the sub-sample tests, which ascertain that 
analysts create value through reducing information asymmetry and supervision.     
Early evidence indicates that analyst coverage tends to vary with certain 
firm characteristics such as business risk, size, and quality (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; 
Chung and Jo, 1996; and Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2004).  These observable firm 
characteristics and/or an unobservable latent factor could possibly affect corporate 
cash policy and analyst coverage simultaneously, resulting in a biased coefficient 
estimation and incorrect inference.  This paper endeavors to identify means for 
mitigating this endogeneity concern.  First, I use the expected analyst coverage 
from the two-stage least squares method using the industry median number of 
analysts as an instrument variable and the lagged values of analyst coverage as 
alternatives.8  The positive relationship between cash holdings and analyst 
coverage is robust to these two model alternatives.  Second, I study the time-
series effect of analyst coverage by examining the effect of a change in analyst 
coverage on the change in cash holdings, while using the two-stage least squares 
method to control for the potential endogeneity issue.  The regression result 
                                                 
8
 In addition, I augment the main model with additional instruments such as prior 
trading volume and volatility to verify the validity of the choice of instrument. 
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shows a positive incremental effect of a change in analyst coverage on a change in 
cash holdings.  Third, I relate the impact of analyst coverage on cash holdings 
with the experiment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD).  A temporary 
reduced impact of analyst coverage on corporate cash policy in the short-term 
post-Reg FD period combined with the gradual increase of the impact in the long-
term period also confirms the positive relationship between cash holdings and 
analyst coverage. 
Most importantly, to fully overcome the endogeneity issue that could 
potentially bias the estimations, I employ a non-standard approach from a unique 
dataset to perform a novel comparison of cash holdings between public and 
private firms.  Given private firms have no analyst coverage, this clear identity 
allows us to mitigate the possible endogeneity concern.  With a lower degree of 
information disclosure, private firms suffer from greater information asymmetry, 
which results in higher cost of capital.  The cost of risk hedging can be relatively 
high, given a higher level of financial frictions (Brav, 2009; Bigelli and Sánchez-
Vidal, 2011).  Presumably, private firms tend to rely more on internal financing 
by stockpiling cash.  However, from the regression estimates, I find the striking 
result that public firms hold roughly 8% more cash than their private counterparts 
(significant at the 1% level).  The decision of whether to be public or private can 
be endogenous to the fundamental differences in firm characteristics (e.g., sales, 
R&D, capital expenditure, and leverage).  I further apply the propensity score 
matching technique to control for such differences.  The results are robust to this 
alternative technique.  In addition, using the novel sample that consists of private 
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firms that were public at one time, the regression estimate shows firms tend to 
hold more cash while public than after going private.  Evidence from the 
comparison of public and private firms and the analysis of going-private firms 
supports the notion of analyst coverage on corporate cash policy.  Greater analyst 
coverage reduces information asymmetry and possible agency concerns, resulting 
in a higher valuation of holding cash.  The trade-off framework suggests firms 
will hoard more cash given the benefits of doing so (e.g., precautionary motives) 
outweigh the costs of holding cash.  Reduced information asymmetry lowers the 
cost of equity financing.  Public firms can also raise precautionary cash reserves 
from the external market, which results in the significant difference between their 
cash holdings and those of their private counterparts. 
Next, this paper studies the monitoring role of analysts on firms’ 
accumulation and spending of excess cash, given excess cash is subject to 
potential agency conflict.  The findings show analysts not only prevent firms from 
holding too much excess cash, but also deter firms from squandering excess cash 
reserves. This investigation suggests the marginal value of cash can be diluted 
when firms hold a considerable amount of excess cash.  However, given the 
monitoring effect of analysts, this negative impact of excess cash can be lessened, 
confirming the impact of analysts’ monitoring on firms’ accumulation and 
spending of excess cash.  In addition, this paper examines the nonlinear 
relationship between cash holdings and analysts.  The results suggest a hump-
shaped relation between cash holdings and analysts.  However, the impact of 
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analysts on cash holdings remains positive and economically significant across 
different decile groups. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, it 
examines how analysts influence the corporate liquidity decision.  If shareholders 
view analysts’ role as important, the impact analysts have on the principal and 
agent relation in a corporation should be apparent.  This paper identifies such a 
direct impact, seen in an increase in analyst coverage and a resulting increase in 
cash holdings.  Second, this paper investigates the net value of analysts as seen by 
shareholders to shed light on the controversial impact of analysts’ activities.  This 
paper substantiates a channel through which analysts can improve firm value by 
increasing the value of cash holdings.  This finding also verifies that equity 
holders recognize the marginal value of cash reserves related to analysts’ 
activities.  Third, this paper contributes to the growing literature on precautionary 
motives and corporate cash policy and provides empirical supports regarding how 
information asymmetry and its associated agency concern affect precautionary 
cash savings.  Finally, this paper is one of the first studies on cash policy for both 
US public and private firms and for going-private firms alone.  By exploring cash 
policy between public and private firms, this paper discovers how precautionary 
motives would drive the differences in cash policy between public and private 
firms as well as before and after firms go private, which highlights a discrepancy 
of financing hierarchy theory.  This paper also contributes to the analyst literature 
by emphasizing the extent and economic significance of analyst coverage on the 
cash policies of public firms. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 develops 
hypotheses.  Chapter 3 describes the data and sample selection.  Chapter 4 
presents and discusses the findings.  Chapter 5 studies the impact of analysts on 
excess cash accumulation and dissipation, and examines the nonlinearity relation 
between analysts and corporate cash holdings.  Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Analysts and Monitoring 
Managers may have incentives to expand their businesses and gain control 
power from such expansions.  If managers’ compensation is tied to short-term 
performance, the potential conflict between principals and agents will be 
amplified; that is, the stock-based compensation will result in managerial myopia.  
As Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose, self-interested managers’ rent-seeking 
behavior can include spending cash reserves on riskier investments or other 
activities to maximize their own objectives at the expense of shareholders. 
Similarly, Myers and Rajan (1998) propose that greater liquidity can provide an 
incentive for managers to increase the probability of self-dealing via a variety of 
asset transformations; in other words, self-interested managers can use cash to pay 
themselves excessively, use it for perquisites, or transform it into specific assets to 
reduce investors’ possible liquidation.  Empirical findings include Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith’s (2007) assertion that the value of cash is lower when a firm is 
poorly governed, and poorly governed firms tend to disperse cash easily.  From a 
study of international data, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) find the 
value of cash holdings is lower in countries with poor investor protection.  
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) show that acquiring firms with less disciplinary 
power from the market experience lower announcement abnormal returns, and the 
authors relate this finding with the empire-building behavior of entrenched 
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managers.  Therefore, corporate cash policy provides a natural experiment for 
examining the monitoring role of analysts.   
Yu (2008) shows that firms with more analyst coverage have lower 
earnings management activities.  Lindsey and Mola (2010) show that compared 
with their peer groups, dropped coverage firms tend to manage their earnings 
upward in the years after loss of analyst coverage.  When firms regain coverage, 
the upward earnings management activities decrease.  However, the decreased 
earnings management activities are only for firms that regain coverage by many 
analysts.  Hence the authors conclude that competition among analysts can induce 
analysts’ monitoring behavior.  Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2008) also offer 
evidence from a detailed survey suggesting analysts contribute to the detection of 
major corporate fraud.  Therefore, to the extent that management decisions and 
operations are closely scrutinized by analysts, the presence of analysts prevents 
management from making poor investments and reduces the expropriation from 
shareholders’ wealth.  I therefore refer to this oversight as the “monitoring effect 
hypothesis”.  This hypothesis predicts the cash level will increase with analyst 
coverage due to the efficient use of liquid assets. 
Analysts and Information 
Even when companies hold cash for legitimate reasons and in the best 
interests of outside shareholders (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009), the liquid nature 
of cash and the enormous amount of cash holdings by US corporations can 
generate significant information uncertainty and concerns about what factors can 
explain the pattern of such large holdings.  Under Merton (1987)’s framework, 
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when all investors have only a subset of information and their portfolio selections 
depend on this information, firms holding a large amount of cash would spur a 
considerable amount of uncertainty, decreasing their valuations.  Analysts 
routinely collect relevant information through directly interacting with 
management and raising questions regarding a firm’s policies. With professional 
training and experience, analysts can better analyze all earnings information, 
distribute information and concerns regarding firms’ prospects and operations, 
and make recommendations and forecasts public via various channels.  Analysts 
can improve the information environment as well as investor cognizance by 
providing information about the utilization of corporate cash reserves.  The 
improved information environment will increase firm value through the valuation 
of cash holdings.  In addition, given the cost of capital increases with information 
asymmetry,9 reduced information asymmetry can facilitate firms’ ability to obtain 
proceeds from external financing as their precautionary cash reserves.  Chang, 
Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006) show that firms with greater analyst coverage utilize 
more equity financing than debt financing.  Hertzel and Li (2010) show that firms 
use issue proceeds for stockpiling cash.  In a similar vein, McLean (2010) shows 
that share issuance-cash savings have increased over time, and this increasing 
trend of cash savings is a result of precautionary motives.  Thus, if a manager’s 
performance measure is tied to firm valuation, the information intermediary 
mechanism of analysts can encourage managers to seek long-term growth 
                                                 
9
 See, for example, Merton (1987), Lucas and McDonald (1990), and Easley and 
O’Hara (2004) for information asymmetry and cost of capital.  
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potential, search for new projects, and hedge for business risk, which results in 
more cash holdings.   
Having sufficient cash holdings is even more critical when outside funds 
are scarce, for example, during economic recession.  When a manager observes a 
private signal regarding a firm’s prospects, she might want to hoard more cash to 
preserve the company’s growth opportunities and to insure against unexpected 
losses from operations due to the economic downturn (Campello, Graham, and 
Harvey, 2010; Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec, 2011). Analysts’ information 
will enhance the integrity of a manager’s decision and reduce the information gap 
between that manager and the shareholders.  Hence a manager will be able to hold 
a sufficient amount of cash in expectation of such an unfavorable event as an 
economic downturn.  Otherwise, if the costs of information asymmetries and 
associated agency concerns, reflected in a trading discount or possible shareholder 
control contests, exceed the benefits of holding cash, the manager might have to 
abstain from positive NPV investments or engage in inefficient project 
termination (Fayele (2004)).  The information intermediary function of analysts 
can reduce information asymmetry and thus increase the benefits of holding cash 
(i.e., precautionary motives such as risk hedging, capturing growth/investment 
opportunities, or minimizing transaction costs).10  As predicted by trade-off theory, 
firms will increase their cash holdings when the benefits of doing so outweigh the 
                                                 
10
 Lowered information asymmetry could result in a decrease in financial 
constraints.  Accessing the market will be easier for firms when they need cash, 
which suggests a lower level of cash holdings.  However, the effect of this 
possibility will be an empirical question. 
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costs of holding cash.  I refer to this correlation as the “information effect 
hypothesis”.   
Related studies on analyst coverage and information environment include 
Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) who find cross-listed firms have better information 
environment in terms of more analyst coverage and higher forecast accuracy, 
which enhance firm value.  Mehran and Peristiani (2010) use analyst coverage as 
one of the proxies for financial visibility.  They find the lack of analyst coverage 
reduces visibility and lowers investor interests.  Thus the costs might outweigh 
the benefits of staying public, leading firms to go private.  With regard to cash 
holdings and idiosyncratic risk, Lai, Sodjahin, and Soumaré (2010) find firms’ 
cash holdings increase with non-business idiosyncratic risk, and this relation 
increases with analyst coverage.   Grüninger and Hirschvogl (2007) use data from 
more than 45 countries also support the view that information asymmetry might 
decrease the marginal value of cash.        
Although the information effect and monitoring effect hypotheses predict 
a positive relation between cash holdings and analyst coverage, evaluating how 
the information and monitoring effects of analysts contribute to this positive 
relation is not easy.  Hence I follow Faulkender and Wang (2006) in estimating 
the marginal value of cash and its interaction with analyst coverage.  In particular, 
based on these two hypotheses, one would expect to observe a positive relation 
between analyst coverage and the incremental value of a dollar.  I go further in 
my estimation by segregating the sample into two subgroups based on the level of 
information asymmetry and potential agency conflict to verify the impact of 
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analysts as information intermediaries and monitors. 
 20 
Chapter 3 
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
I retrieve analyst information from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S Detail 
History file.  Accounting variables are from CRSP/Compustat Merged database 
and stock returns are from CRSP.  The sample period is from 1984 to 2009.  As 
this paper intends to study the overall impact of analysts on firm cash policy, the 
sample includes firms with no analyst coverage, because we should see a larger 
impact between firms with no coverage and those with at least one analyst 
covered.11  Also, all observations must have all required variables.  Following 
previous literature, I exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000 - 6999) and utilities 
firms (SIC codes 4900 - 4999) because of special capital requirements and 
regulations, respectively.  I further require firms to have positive total assets 
(Compustat item #6) and positive sales (Compustat item #12).  The final sample 
contains 94,636 firm-year observations.   
In the first part of the regression analysis, I study the relation between cash 
holdings and analyst coverage using the following model: 
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11
 In untabulated results, I utilize a sample using only firms with at least one 
analyst covering them.  The results are similar to those reported in all tables.  
 21 
where  
1. Cash is cash and marketable securities divided by book assets (#1 / #6). 
2. 
 are year fixed effects. 
3. 
 are industry fixed effects.12 
4. Coverage is analyst coverage, which is the sum of all analysts 
following a firm for a given fiscal year. 
5. Industry sigma is computed as follows.  First, for each firm in a given 
year, I obtain the standard deviation of its cash flow to net assets ratio 
((#13 - #15 - #16 - #21) / (#6 - #1)) for the previous 10 years, requiring 
at least 3 observations.  Second, I take the average of cash flow 
standard deviation based on the two-digit SIC code and treat this 
averaged cash flow standard deviation as the measure of cash flow 
volatility for a given firm. 
6. M/B is the market-to-book ratio computed as the book value of assets 
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of assets divided 
by the book value of assets ((#6 - #60 + (#199 * #25)) / #6). 
7. Firm size is measured as the logarithm of the book value of assets in 
2004 dollars (log(#6)). 
8. Cash flow is defined as earnings before depreciation minus interest, 
dividends, and taxes divided by book assets ((#13 - #15 - #16 - #21) / 
#6). 
                                                 
12
 In some models and unreported tables, I include firm fixed effects instead in the 
regression analysis.  The results are robust to this alternative. 
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9. NWC is net working capital minus cash plus marketable securities 
divided by book assets ((#179 - #1) / #6). 
10. CAPX is computed as capital expenditure divided by book assets 
(#128 / #6). 
11. Leverage is long-term debt plus short-term liabilities divided by book 
assets ((#9 + #34) / #6). 
12. R&D is computed as (#46 / #12) and set to zero if missing. 
13. Dividend dummy equals 1 if the firm pays a dividend for a given year. 
14. AQC is computed as acquisitions to book assets (#129 / #6). 
 
Additional variables include the G-index, constructed as the number of anti-
takeover provisions between 0 and 24, which is from RiskMetrics, and 
institutional ownership holdings from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings 
(13F) Database.  Following Cremers and Nair (2005), I compute institutional 
block holdings as the sum of all institutional owners that hold more than 5% of a 
firm’s equity.  To improve the interpretation of the impact of analyst coverage, I 
rank firms into deciles and set them from 0 to 1.  I also sort firms into deciles 
based on the G-index and institutional holdings, respectively, and transform the 
deciles from 0 to 1, where 0 represents the worst governance (highest G-index 
group and lowest institutional block holdings group) and 1 represents the best 
governance (lowest G-index group and highest institutional block holdings group).  
All financial variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate 
the impact of outliers. 
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Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics.  The average cash holding is 
16.6% of total assets and the median is 8.4%, which shows that the distribution of 
cash holdings is skewed to the right.  Additionally, the median firm is covered by 
three analysts, has approximately 31% institutional ownership, and has a G-index 
of 9.  Figure 1 shows the average cash holdings for different levels of analyst 
coverage in each firm size tercile.  I divide firms into three size groups (small, 
medium, and large) based on the book value of assets.  Figure 1 confirms that 
small firms hold more cash in general as in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009).  Given 
the information and monitoring effect hypotheses, one would expect the impact of 
analysts to be more pronounced for the small-size group.  For the small-size group, 
we indeed observe the clear upward trend of the level of cash holdings when 
moving from the lowest- to the highest-analyst coverage decile, and this trend 
supports the hypotheses.  The medium- and large-size groups also reveal the 
positive relationship between analyst following and cash holdings.  The positive 
relation for the large-size group seems to be flatter due to the scaling issue.  A 
simple regression of cash holdings on a constant and analyst coverage for each 
size group finds a significant and positive coefficient for each. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for all variables in the panel sample.  I 
include only US companies from 1984–2009 and exclude all financial firms (SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6999) and utility firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 
4999).  Cash is defined as cash plus marketable securities to the book value of 
assets (#1 / #6)
.  
Industry Sigma is the average of cash flow standard deviations of 
firms within the same two-digit SIC industry for a given year.  M/B is market-to-
book ratio, calculated by the book value of assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity to the book value of assets ((#6 - #60 + (#199 * 
#25)) / #6).  Firm Size is the logarithm of the book value of assets in 2004 dollars.  
Cash flow
 
is defined as earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes but before 
depreciation divided by book value of assets ((#13 - #15 - #16 -#21) / #6).  NWC
 
is defined as net working capital minus cash to the book value of assets ((#179 - 
#1) / #6).  CAPX
 
is capital expenditures to the book value of assets (#128 / #6).  
Leverage is computed by long-term debt plus short-term debt book assets over the 
book value of assets ((#9 + #34) / #6).  R&D is research and development 
expenses to sales and set to zero if missing (#46 / #12).  Dividend dummy
 
equals 
one in years in which a firm pays a dividend (#21).  AQC
 
is acquisitions to the 
book value of assets (#129 / #6).  Coverage
 
is the number of analysts following a 
firm for a given fiscal year from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database.  Inst. Block 
Holdings
 
refers to the sum of all institutional ownership positions greater than 5% 
from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database.  Inst. Holdings
 
refers to the sum of all ownership positions held by institutional investors from 
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database.  Pension Fund Holdings 
are the ownership positions held by the 12 largest pension funds from Thomson-
Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database.  G-index
 
refers to Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick managerial entrenchment index from RiskMetrics.  All ratio 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percentiles.  The final sample 
covers 94,636 firm-year observations.   
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Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Std 
Cash 94636 0.166 0.024 0.084 0.236 0.197 
Industry Sigma 94636 0.073 0.051 0.071 0.096 0.027 
M/B  94636 1.859 1.047 1.371 2.041 1.524 
Firm Size 94636 5.372 3.800 5.227 6.794 2.144 
Cash flow 94636 0.025 0.011 0.064 0.107 0.173 
NWC 94636 0.102 -0.024 0.085 0.227 0.188 
CAPX 94636 0.063 0.021 0.043 0.080 0.066 
Leverage 94636 0.217 0.040 0.193 0.343 0.188 
R&D 94636 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.055 1.154 
Dividend dummy 94636 0.345 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.475 
AQC 94636 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.055 
Coverage 94636 6.219 0.000 3.000 9.000 8.567 
Inst. Block 
Holdings 
91977 0.115 0.000 0.076 0.184 0.127 
Inst. Holdings 91977 0.360 0.095 0.306 0.588 0.290 
Pension Fund 
Holdings 
91977 0.011 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.018 
Gindex 19966 9.051 7.000 9.000 11.000 2.737 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 1. Average Cash 
Each Firm Size Tercile 
 
The figure represents the average cash ratio for different levels of analyst 
following for each firm size 
securities divided by book 
measured by book assets
and highest analyst coverage deciles
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Holdings for Different Levels of Analyst Following
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Chapter 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
To analyze the impact of analysts on corporate cash holdings, I first 
present the results from regression analyses using Bates, Kahle, and Stulz’s (2009) 
cash holdings model.  Second, to verify the overall effect of analysts on the firm 
value, I apply Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model to estimate the marginal 
value of cash holdings conditional on analyst coverage.  Third, analysts can more 
greatly influence firms suffering from severe information asymmetry and 
potential agency conflict.  By segregating my sample twice into two subgroups—
first based on the level of information asymmetry and then again based on agency 
conflict—I examine the equality of  coefficients on the interaction term between 
change in cash and analyst coverage between these subgroups.  Some of the 
regressions control for the managerial entrenchment index and institutional block 
holdings, whereas others do not.  Also, I consider the endogeneity issue that could 
drive the results between analysts and corporate cash policy, using various 
techniques including expected coverage from the 2SLS method, the lagged 
analyst coverage, the impact of change in analyst coverage on the change in cash 
holdings under the 2SLS framework, and the analyst coverage in conjunction with 
post-Reg FD periods.  To further address the robustness of the results, I compare 
the cash policies between public and private firms, as well as between the pre- 
and post-periods of going-private firms, to extract the extent and benefits of 
analyst coverage on public firms, given that analysts do not cover private firms, 
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even if they were once public.  Note that for most of regression analyses, I control 
for industry and year fixed effects. 
Analyst Following and the Level of Cash Holdings 
Using Eq. (1), Table 2 presents the regression results of cash holdings on 
analyst coverage and other control variables.  Without adding the analyst 
coverage effect, Model 1 shows the result identical to Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 
(2009) with expected signs.  For example, firms with higher market-to-book ratios 
or cash flow volatility hold more cash because of better investment opportunities 
and other precautionary reasons, respectively.  Net working capital can be 
considered a substitute for cash, reflected in its negative relationship to cash.  
Capital expenditure can be treated as collateral or a source for temporary 
investment shock, which creates a negative relation with cash.  Given the 
financing hierarchy model, firms prefer cash over debt, which results in a negative 
relation between cash and leverage.  Further, considering economies of scale, we 
expect the sign of the coefficient on size to be negatively related to cash.   
Model 2 examines the relation between corporate cash holdings and 
analyst coverage using the number of analysts following a firm in a given year.  
The result points to a significant and positive relation between analyst following 
on a firm’s cash holdings, all else being equal.  All other control variables are 
with expected signs. 
Model 3 considers the impact of analyst coverage on cash holdings using 
the analyst coverage deciles.  Based on the cross-sectional analysis, the result 
from Model 3 confirms cash holdings are positively related to analyst coverage.  
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The findings from models 2 and 3 support the hypotheses that firms with more 
analyst coverage have lower information asymmetry and potential agency conflict, 
which lead to more cash holdings.  More importantly, based on the coefficient of 
analyst coverage in Model 3, an increase in analyst coverage from the lowest- to 
the highest-coverage decile in turn increases cash holdings by 5.2 percentage 
points, or approximately 31% of the sample average of cash balances.13  
Therefore, the impact of analyst coverage is not only statistically significant but 
economically important.   
Numerous papers have shown that well-informed institutional investors 
serve as an external monitoring mechanism,14 and that institutional investors and 
analysts might be interrelated because of analysts’ customer relationship with 
various financial institutions (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990).  Furthermore, 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct an index of anti-takeover provisions 
that are often viewed as a measure of shareholder rights as well as the degree of 
managers’ opportunism/entrenchment.  If firms are better governed in terms of the 
level of institutional block holdings and entrenchment, we could see a reduction 
in the overall misuse of cash by managers and therefore a positive relation 
between cash holdings and both institutional block holdings and the anti-takeover 
index.  Thus Model 4 takes institutional ownership as well as the G-index into 
                                                 
13
 0.052/0.166 = 0.313.  Based on the sample mean of cash holdings 0.166.  
 
14
 See, for example, Sheleifer and Vishy (1986) who argue that large shareholders 
play an important role in monitoring.  Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) 
find that firms that perform poorly in the past tend to attract proxy proposals 
initiated by shareholders.  This finding is stronger for firms with greater 
institutional ownership.  
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account.  Consistent with previous literature, the sign on the coefficient estimate 
for institutional investors is positive (though not statistically significant), which is 
consistent with institutional holders enhancing manager discipline.15  The 
regression coefficient on the G-index resembles the finding of Harford, Mansi, 
and Maxwell (2008) that poorly governed firms tend to have lower cash reserves.  
Moreover, the influence of analyst coverage remains unchanged and significant at 
the 1% level while controlling for the other two corporate governance 
mechanisms.  Therefore, given the monitoring effect hypothesis, one may infer 
analysts and institutional investors serve as different external governance 
functions for the firm.   
Instead of industry fixed effects, Model 5 considers the analyst coverage 
using the number of analysts while controlling for firm fixed effects.  Controlling 
for firm fixed effects enables us to understand the relation between the change of 
corporate cash holdings and the change of analyst coverage.  Including firm fixed 
effects can also partially mitigate the concern about unobservable firm 
heterogeneity.  Model 6 uses analyst coverage deciles instead while controlling 
for firm fixed effects.  As seen in models 5 and 6, the positive relation between 
cash holdings and analyst coverage is robust to these firm fixed effects model 
specifications, which concludes analyst coverage has a time-series effect on 
corporate cash holdings. 
                                                 
15
 In an unreported test, I include institutional holdings only with analyst coverage 
and all other control variables.  The regression result on the coefficient of 
institutional holdings shows a significant and positive relation. 
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Finally, Model 7 includes institutional holdings and the G-index.  The 
result still confirms a positive impact of analyst coverage on cash holdings.  In 
untabulated results, I also adopt the Fama-Macbeth regression approach similar to 
the Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) model and employ the 
logarithm of cash-to-net assets ratio as an alternative proxy for cash level.  
Overall, the results based on these different specifications show the coefficient on 
analyst coverage is significantly positive and robust. 
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Table 2: Regression Analysis of Cash Holdings and Analyst Coverage 
 
This table presents regression results for all US companies from 1984–2009.  A 
firm must have a positive book value of total assets and positive sales to be 
included in the sample.  Financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and 
utility firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) are excluded.  Except as noted, 
the dependent variable and independent variables are defined as in Table 1.  
Model 1 is the baseline regression.  Models 2 and 5 use Analyst coverage (No. of) 
as coverage that is defined as the logarithm of the number of analysts plus one.  
Models 3, 4, 6, and 7 use Analyst coverage (Decile) as coverage that is defined as 
the deciles of analyst coverage.  Models 1–4 include industry and year fixed 
effects.  Models 5–7 include firm and year fixed effects.  The final sample covers 
94,636 firm-year observations.  All ratio variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1 percentiles.  T-stats, based on standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering, are in parentheses.  *** indicates 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.   
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Dependent variable: Cash / Assets 
  Coverage Defined As:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 BKS Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Decile) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Decile) 
w/  
Inst. 
Block  
Holdings 
& G index 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Decile) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Decile) 
w/  
Inst. 
Block 
Holdings 
& G index 
        
Coverage  0.013*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.007*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
  (11.02) (12.18) (4.99) (5.27) (6.21) (3.34) 
Industry Sigma 0.526*** 0.505*** 0.500*** 0.338*** 0.127 0.127 -0.012 
 (7.52) (7.25) (7.18) (2.86) (1.61) (1.61) (-0.10) 
M/B 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (20.12) (18.40) (18.27) (11.49) (14.56) (14.50) (6.62) 
Firm Size -0.006*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.029*** -0.003 -0.003* -0.014*** 
 (-9.20) (-14.19) (-14.75) (-16.02) (-1.42) (-1.66) (-3.62) 
Cash Flow -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.184*** 0.016** 0.016** -0.003 
 (-8.04) (-8.33) (-8.47) (-7.41) (2.26) (2.25) (-0.12) 
NWC -0.296*** -0.300*** -0.301*** -0.323*** -0.275*** -0.275*** -0.295*** 
 (-41.21) (-41.75) (-41.84) (-20.87) (-34.07) (-34.10) (-14.52) 
CAPX -0.337*** -0.357*** -0.359*** -0.445*** -0.285*** -0.286*** -0.364*** 
 (-25.49) (-26.88) (-27.04) (-12.51) (-23.28) (-23.33) (-13.04) 
Leverage -0.356*** -0.347*** -0.348*** -0.228*** -0.259*** -0.259*** -0.126*** 
 (-55.42) (-53.50) (-53.70) (-16.37) (-34.83) (-34.90) (-9.54) 
R&D 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.002 
 (18.78) (18.68) (18.68) (3.64) (7.27) (7.26) (0.42) 
Dividend 
Dummy 
-0.025*** 
(-9.69) 
-0.023*** 
(-8.84) 
-0.022*** 
(-8.68) 
-0.023*** 
(-5.48) 
0.005* 
(1.88) 
0.005* 
(1.87) 
0.002 
(0.39) 
 
AQC -0.212*** -0.223*** -0.225*** -0.260*** -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.200*** 
 (-24.31) (-25.14) (-25.34) (-17.40) (-23.36) (-23.37) (-14.82) 
Inst. Block 
Holdings 
   0.007 
(1.22) 
  0.004 
(0.72) 
      
G index    0.026***   0.009 
    (4.63)   (1.02) 
        
Observations 94,636 94,636 94,636 19,966 94,636 94,636 19,966 
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.510 0.510 0.564 0.766 0.766 0.830 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Firm FE     Yes Yes Yes 
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Endogeneity  
Although this study examines the impact of analyst coverage on corporate 
liquidity policy, there can be an endogeneity concern that a potential unobserved 
latent factor or other observable firm characteristics could affect both cash 
holdings and analyst coverage.  To account for this concern that could possibly 
produce a biased estimation, I employ the two-stage least squares estimation using 
the industry median number of analysts as the instrument variable.16  Presumably, 
some industries tend to attract more analysts due to the incremental value of 
information analysts can generate (e.g, due to their greater marginal value of 
information, high-tech industries will likely attract more analysts than 
manufacturing industries).  Based on the results from a survey of 2,000 financial 
analysts, Chugh and Meador (1984) show that analysts place more emphasis on 
the long-term prospects than on the short-term prospects in terms of a broad set of 
determinants, for example, management quality, market dominance of a company, 
industry long-term prospects, and economic factors.  Hence analysts might decide 
to follow a firm in an industry with higher incremental information value that is 
less likely to relate with firm-specific characteristics or short-term industry 
variation in performance.  The first-stage F-statistic is 154.90 (Table 3, Panel A, 
                                                 
16
 In untabulated regression analyses, I perform several estimations using different 
combinations of additional instruments such as trading volume and return 
volatility, enabling tests of statistical exogeneity.  In the specification augmented 
with trading volume, for example, the Hansen J statistic for over-identification 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (P value = 0.54) 
which raises our confidence level that the instruments are exogenous.  Results are 
similar to those in Panel A.  In addition, I estimate the models using LIML and 
GMM, and results are robust to these alternative methods. 
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column 1), which rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the instrument 
is not significantly different from zero.  Table 3, Panel A, column 2 presents the 
second-stage regression result.  The coefficient of analyst coverage is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, which confirms analyst coverage has a positive impact 
on a firm’s cash holdings. 
In addition, to further address the potential endogeneity issue, I employ 
the lagged number of analysts following the firm.  Prior works indicate that with a 
sufficient lag (e.g., Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2006 and Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell, 2008), the endogeneity concern can be reduced.  In Panel B of Table 3, 
models 1–3 use the number of analysts following with a one-, two- or three-year 
lag, respectively.  The positive relation between cash holdings and analyst 
coverage is apparent in all three lagged-analyst-coverage models. 
As shown in Panel C, I examine the incremental effect of analyst coverage 
by studying the impact of the change in analyst coverage on the change in cash 
holdings.  The analyst coverage could be static in that the number of analysts 
following a given firm every year might not change significantly.  Hence I 
examine the impact of the change in analyst coverage on the change in cash 
holdings for every two-year window.  To control for the potential endogeneity 
issue, I adopt a two-stage least squares approach using the change of industry 
median number of analysts as an instrument.  The first-stage F-statistic is 258.41 
(Model 1 of Panel C), which rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
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instruments is not significantly different from zero.17  The regression estimate 
from Model 2 shows that an increase in cash holdings is associated with an 
increase in analyst following, which demonstrates a positive association between 
a change in cash holdings and a change in analyst following.  This finding 
suggests that with a greater positive change in analyst coverage, firms can benefit 
from a higher level of cash holdings as the information environment is improved 
and the associated potential agency concern is reduced.  The positive association 
from studying the incremental effect model specification confirms that analyst 
coverage has the time-series effect on cash holdings and that analyst coverage is 
an important consideration for a firm determining its cash policy.   
 A fourth way to overcome the potential endogeneity concern is to study 
the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), an exogenous event affecting 
the companies’ information environment.  In late 2000, the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission approved a number of rules requiring firms to disclose any 
material information to all investors rather than selectively disclosing to analysts 
and others in the market.  Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong (2003) show that although 
Reg FD levels the playing field among investors through increasing the quantity 
of current earnings information flow to the public, it also increases the analyst 
forecast dispersion and hinders analysts’ ability to form long-term forecasts (the 
“chilling effect” as managers try to avoid litigation issues and releasing 
                                                 
17
 In untabulated results, I also include change in trading volume as an additional 
instrument.  The Hansen J statistic for over-identification fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid (P value = 0.23). 
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information to benefit their competitors).  By studying a sample of NASDAQ 
securities around the imposition of Reg FD, Sidhu, Smith, Whaley, and Willis 
(2008) find that Reg FD induces the chilling effect (reducing the quality of 
information flow to the public) and imposes greater information discrepancy.  The 
greater information discrepancy thus increases the cost of adverse selection as the 
market demands more compensation.  A survey by the Security Industry 
Association (SIA) shows the quality of information flow has decreased after the 
implementation of Reg FD.  However, Mohanram and Sunder (2006) show that 
when conducting an information analysis, analysts have placed more emphasis on 
the discovery of firm idiosyncratic information to compensate for the shift of 
information environment after Reg FD.  Due to the increased variety of 
information and lower information quality after Reg FD,18 we would expect the 
influence of analyst coverage on cash policy to be reduced for a definite time 
period.  Yet, considering analysts’ adjustments to this change of information 
environment, the increased variety of information and lower information quality 
induce the market to rely more intensively on analysts as information producers, 
thereby increasing the influence of analysts. 
For all models in Panel D, I include an interaction term between analyst 
coverage and a Post-FD dummy to consider the impact of Reg FD on analysts’ 
influence on the firm.  In Model 1, I denote dummy equal to one for the six 
months after Reg FD.  The negative coefficient of the interaction term between 
                                                 
18
 Gintschel and Markov (2004) find that Reg FD has decreased the analysts’ 
informativeness.  
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analyst coverage and the Post-FD dummy indicates the adverse impact of Reg FD 
on analysts, which also suggests the impact of analyst coverage on a firm’s cash 
holdings is diluted.  In models 2–4, I denote the Post-FD dummy equal to one for 
the 12, 18, and 24 months after Reg FD, respectively.  Considering the 
coefficients of interaction term between analyst coverage and the Post-FD dummy 
through these four model specifications, the results on the coefficients of the 
interaction term reveal a flip in sign when moving from the 6- to the 24-month 
window.  The results suggest the impact of Reg FD may have a temporary instead 
of long-term effect on analysts’ activities.  The finding is consistent with the view 
that analysts put effort into discovering new channels for generating useful 
information in order to reverse the unfavorable impact of the implementation of 
Reg FD.  In particular, this finding also suggests analyst coverage has real effect 
on firms’ cash policy. 
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Table 3. Robustness Check – Endogeneity of Analyst Following 
 
The following panels of this table present regression results for all U.S. 
companies from 1984–2009.  A firm must have positive book value of total assets 
and positive sales to be included in the sample.  Financial firms (SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999) and utility firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) are 
excluded. Except as noted, the dependent variable and independent variables are 
defined as in Table 1.  All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.  All 
ratio variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percentiles.  T-stats, based 
on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering, are in 
parentheses.  *** indicates significance at 0.1%, ** at 1%, and * at 5%.  Panel A 
presents regression estimates using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method with 
the industry median number of analysts as an instrument variable.  Panel B 
presents regression estimates using the lagged coverage, which is the logarithm of 
the number of analysts plus one from year t-1, t-2, and t-3, separately.  Panel C 
presents regression estimates for change of cash holdings with change of analyst 
coverage and change of other control variables for every two-year time span.  
Change of analyst coverage is instrumented by change of the industry median 
number of analysts.  Panel D presents regression estimates with the consideration 
of the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on analyst coverage.  The 
Post-FDdummy equals one for the 6-, 12-, 18-, and 24-month periods after Reg 
FD. 
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Panel A. Two-stage least squares regression 
 
   
 2SLS 
 
 
Dependent  
variable: 
First Stage 
 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
Second Stage 
 
Cash/Assets 
   
Coverage  0.005*** 
(4.17)   
Industry median 
No. of analysts 
0.474*** 
(12.45) 
 
  
Industry Sigma 12.442** 0.488*** 
 (2.39) (6.50) 
M/B 0.838*** 0.012*** 
 (24.53) (8.64) 
Firm Size 3.004*** -0.022*** 
 (49.97) (-5.70) 
Cash Flow -0.243 -0.053*** 
 (-1.01) (-7.69) 
NWC 0.322 -0.298*** 
 (1.11) (-40.24) 
CAPX 6.731*** -0.375*** 
 (9.38) (-22.21) 
Leverage -4.785*** -0.331*** 
 (-17.44) (-37.08) 
R&D -0.031 0.025*** 
 (-0.96) (18.61) 
Dividend Dummy -1.067*** -0.019*** 
 (-7.71) (-6.45) 
AQC 0.199 -0.215*** 
 (0.40) (-23.07) 
   
Observations 94,636 94,636 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500 0.483 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
First-Stage F-stat 154.90***  
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Panel B. Lagged analyst coverage regression 
 
Dependent variable: Cash / Assets 
 Lagged Coverage Defined As: 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
t-1 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
t-2 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
t-3 
    
Lagged Coverage 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
 (8.22) (5.87) (4.04) 
Industry Sigma 0.531*** 0.533*** 0.545*** 
 (7.22) (6.82) (6.62) 
M/B 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (18.60) (17.40) (16.10) 
Firm Size -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-12.92) (-11.93) (-11.30) 
Cash Flow -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.060*** 
 (-6.85) (-6.76) (-6.69) 
NWC -0.296*** -0.297*** -0.299*** 
 (-39.02) (-36.14) (-33.69) 
CAPX -0.359*** -0.367*** -0.376*** 
 (-24.82) (-23.20) (-21.89) 
Leverage -0.344*** -0.340*** -0.338*** 
 (-49.88) (-46.18) (-43.21) 
R&D 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (18.24) (17.00) (15.85) 
Dividend Dummy -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (-7.87) (-6.92) (-6.30) 
AQC -0.215*** -0.214*** -0.211*** 
 (-23.12) (-22.02) (-20.68) 
    
Observations 84,087 73,871 65,011 
Adjusted R-squared 0.505 0.501 0.497 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel C. Change of analyst coverage regression 
 
  
 2SLS 
 (1) (2) 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
First-stage 
 
∆ Coverage 
Second-stage 
 
∆ Cash / Assets 
   
∆ Coverage  0.006*** 
  (3.34) 
∆ Industry median 
No. of analysts 
0.266*** 
(16.08) 
 
   
∆ Industry Sigma -2.309 0.317*** 
 (-1.14) (3.42) 
∆ M/B -0.051*** 0.010*** 
 (-2.66) (11.31) 
∆ Firm Size 2.172*** 0.001 
 (36.94) (0.19) 
∆ Cash Flow -1.288*** 0.053*** 
 (-10.50) (5.86) 
∆ NWC 0.986*** -0.284*** 
 (6.81) (-29.99) 
∆ CAPX 2.892*** -0.280*** 
 (9.48) (-18.41) 
∆ Leverage -1.808*** -0.220*** 
 (-11.35) (-24.59) 
∆ R&D 0.014 0.007*** 
 (0.65) (4.65) 
∆ Dividend Dummy 0.453*** 0.001 
 (5.91) (0.25) 
∆ AQC -0.390 -0.180*** 
 (-1.43) (-18.13) 
Constant -0.219*** -0.008*** 
 (-12.82) (-13.19) 
   
Observations 36,876 36,876 
Adjusted R-squared 0.095 0.113 
First-Stage F-stat 258.41***  
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Panel D. Post-FD dummy regression 
 
Dependent variable: Cash / Assets     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
<= 6 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
<=12 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
<=18 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(No. of) 
<=24 
     
Coverage 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 (11.72) (11.64) (11.44) (11.32) 
Coverage*Post-FDdummy -0.003* 
(-1.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 
0.002 
(1.23) 
0.003** 
(2.12) 
Post-FDdummy -0.001 -0.005 -0.005* -0.008** 
 (-0.24) (-1.52) (-1.71) (-2.54) 
Industry Sigma 0.306*** 0.308*** 0.309*** 0.311*** 
 (5.56) (5.59) (5.61) (5.64) 
M/B 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (17.82) (17.81) (17.77) (17.74) 
Firm Size -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (-14.87) (-14.85) (-14.82) (-14.80) 
Cash Flow -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.059*** 
 (-8.67) (-8.69) (-8.69) (-8.70) 
NWC -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.304*** 
 (-42.40) (-42.40) (-42.42) (-42.42) 
CAPX -0.363*** -0.363*** -0.363*** -0.363*** 
 (-27.69) (-27.69) (-27.70) (-27.70) 
Leverage -0.350*** -0.350*** -0.350*** -0.351*** 
 (-54.70) (-54.71) (-54.72) (-54.74) 
R&D 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (18.86) (18.86) (18.86) (18.86) 
Dividend Dummy -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (-8.88) (-8.88) (-8.85) (-8.84) 
AQC -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.221*** 
 (-25.28) (-25.28) (-25.29) (-25.30) 
     
Observations 94,636 94,636 94,636 94,636 
Adjusted R-squared 0.507 0.507 0.506 0.507 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Public and Private Firms and Going-Private Firms  
Using the two-stage least squares method, and lagged analyst following 
model has demonstrated the robustness of the impact of analyst coverage on 
corporate cash holdings.  The study of the incremental effect of analyst coverage 
on a firm’s cash holdings, as well as the incorporation of the Reg FD experiment 
in the regression analysis, further supports the positive relation between cash 
holdings and analyst coverage.  Nonetheless, this paper emphasizes rigorous 
considerations of the endogeneity issue to study the causality of analyst coverage 
on corporate cash holdings.  Thus, as a further test, I study cash holdings policy in 
public and private companies as well as in going-private firms, given that private 
firms, including those that were public at one time, have no analyst coverage.  
 Private firms are more opaque given their lower degree of information 
disclosure.  The opaqueness comes with a considerable information asymmetry 
from the market participants’ perspective.  The information asymmetry resulting 
from the information advantage managers have can lead to higher adverse 
selection costs, especially for information-sensitive securities such as equity.  
Thus firms would prefer less information-sensitive securities (given that the cost 
of these information-sensitive securities is relatively less) such as debt when 
accessing the external capital market.  However, as managers will utilize more 
debt until the marginal cost of debt equals the marginal cost of equity, the 
leverage ratio will eventually rise, which increases the cost of debt financing due 
to a higher probability of financial distress.  Given that the cost of accessing the 
external capital market is costly, the cost of risk hedging will also increase. Thus 
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firms would ultimately prefer internal financing over external financing, which 
leads firms to hold more cash.   
The financing hierarchy framework starts from the pecking order theory 
proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984).  Myers and Majluf (1984) study the effect 
of information asymmetry on corporate capital structure.  Bharath, Pasquariello, 
and Wu (2008) show information asymmetry, the core assumption of the pecking 
order theory, is indeed an important determinant of firms’ financing decisions, 
especially under severe adverse selection conditions.  Brav (2009) finds private 
firms tend to have a higher leverage ratio than public firms and are reluctant to 
visit external markets, and that private firms tend to stockpile cash in good times.  
Hence, under the financing hierarchy framework, private firms should hold more 
cash, considering the cost of raising capital from the external market is more 
expensive.  Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2011) argue that as the levels of 
uncertainties and risks are relatively high in private firms, private firms should 
hold more cash.  In addition, the ownership structure is more concentrated in 
private firms in which a few shareholders have majority control, which means the 
potential agency conflict should be lower, resulting in higher cash holdings.   
Given the higher cost of capital resulting from information asymmetry and a more 
concentrated ownership structure, we would observe higher cash holdings in 
private firms.  However, if analysts’ information and monitoring effects have the 
expected impact, we would find public firms with analyst followings can have 
higher cash holdings than their private counterparts, thereby demonstrating the 
impact of analysts on corporate cash holdings.   
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 The data source of private firms is Capital IQ.  I exclude private firms 
with public debt as well as private investment firms, as their information and 
business environments could be different from that of stand-alone private 
companies.  I also exclude financial and utility firms from the sample.  In addition, 
firms could self-select to go public or private based on considerations of 
information production, monitoring, access to the market, liquidity, or corporate 
control.  I therefore exclude going-public and going-private firms, and address the 
latter in a later test.  In other words, I only include companies whose current 
status is public or private incorporated entities.  As market valuation is not 
available for private firms, I use three-year sales growth as a proxy for investment 
opportunities and require at least two years of observations for a given firm.   
Table 4 separates the data into public and private firms and provides the 
descriptive statistics for both and the comparison of key firm characteristics 
between these two types of firms.  Panel A provides the number of public and 
private firms each year.  The data range is from year 2003 to 2009, with 26,853 
firm-year observations.  The number of public firms is approximately four times 
larger than the number of private firms.  The number of unique private firms is 
decreasing in more recent years as Capital IQ continues to backfill the data for 
early years, focusing less on collecting stand-alone private firms.  
To understand whether a company’s status (public or private) can result in 
a difference of its cash policy, in Panel B of Table 4, I present the result of 
univariate test of cash holdings between public and private firms, which examines 
whether the level of cash holdings differs significantly between these two types of 
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firms.  The first column reports the level of cash holdings and other key firm 
characteristics for public firms.  The second column reports the same information 
for private firms.  The third column provides the t-stat (z-stat based on 
Wilcoxon’s rank sum test) for the differences in mean (median) of key firm 
characteristics between public and private firms.  The results based on the 
comparison of mean and median show a significant difference in cash holdings 
between public and private firms.  Public firms generally hold more cash, with an 
average of 21% and a median of 12.9%, whereas private firms hold less cash with 
an average of 10.8% and a median of 4.5%.  The t-stat and z-stat confirm the 
differences (10.2% and 8.4%) in mean and median are significant at the 1% level. 
Although this preliminary comparison of cash holdings between public 
and private firms shows strong evidence that public firms tend to have higher cash 
holdings, the results may simply reflect the potential fundamental differences in 
firm characteristics between public and private firms.  In Panel B, I also compare 
the differences of key firm characteristics between public and private firms.  
Public firms are larger when comparing both mean and median values.  The 
difference is at the 1% significance level.  Private firms have higher cash flow, 
which could reflect their high three-year sales growth (the highly right-skewed 
distribution indicates that on average, private firms have better investment 
opportunities).  Public firms and private firms also differ in their net working 
capital, R&D, and leverage.  Public firms have higher net working capital (5.6% 
vs. 2%) and higher R&D (27.1% vs. 20.4%).  However, private firms have higher 
leverage, which suggests they prefer debt financing to equity financing when they 
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have access to the external capital market.  This finding is consistent with Brav 
(2009)’s finding.  Similar results can be obtained when comparing the differences 
in medians among variables. 
Hence the results of the univariate tests provide strong support that public 
firms hold more cash than do private firms.  The results also suggest the 
systematic differences in many key firm characteristics, raising the possibility that 
the differences of the fundamental characteristics may affect the difference in 
cash holdings between public and private firms.  Accordingly, I apply the multiple 
regression analysis to control for these fundamental differences. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Comparison of Key Firm Characteristics – 
Public vs. Private 
 
Panel A presents separately the number of public and private firms within the 
sample for each year, 2003–9.  Panel B also separates private and public firms.  
Except as noted, all variables are defined as in Table 1.  3-yr. Sales Growth is 
defined as three-year compound sales growth.  The first two columns provide the 
mean (median) values for key firm characteristics.  The third column reports the t-
stat (z-stat based on Wilcoxon’s rank sum test) for the difference in means and 
medians between the first two columns.  ***, **, and * indicate the significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Panel A. calendar time distribution -- number of public and private firms 
 
Year No. of Public Firms No. of Private Firms 
2003 3549 960 
2004 3429 876 
2005 3260 815 
2006 3094 727 
2007 2954 584 
2008 2873 480 
2009 2818 434 
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Panel B. Comparison of key firm characteristics -- private vs. public 
 
 Public 
(A) 
Private 
(B) 
Difference 
t-stat(z-stat) 
(A)-(B) 
Cash 0.210 0.108 30.80*** 
 0.129 0.045 38.17*** 
Firm Size 6.073 5.219 24.92*** 
 6.003 5.588 19.28*** 
Cash Flow 0.028 0.047        -5.54*** 
 0.068 0.134        -37.20*** 
NWC 0.056 0.020 12.15*** 
 0.041 0.030         5.06*** 
CAPX 0.050 0.049         1.18 
 0.031 0.029         5.10*** 
Leverage 0.183 0.510        -86.26*** 
 0.148 0.469        -55.52*** 
R&D 0.271 0.204         2.90*** 
 0.005 0.000 22.24*** 
3-yr. Sales Growth 0.568 0.843        -10.00*** 
 0.260 0.204         2.89 *** 
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Table 5, Panel A, Model 1 presents the regression estimates in which I 
include a private-firm dummy and control for industry and year fixed effects.  The 
private-firm dummy equals one when a firm’s status is private.  I also require 
public firms to have at least one analyst following it.  The data range is from year 
2003 to 2009, with 21,994 firm-year observations.  The estimated coefficient of 
the private-firm dummy is negative and economically significant since this 
finding suggests, all else being equal, private firms hold roughly 7.9% less cash 
than public firms.  The finding is consistent with the argument that although 
private firms could hold more cash due to information asymmetry consideration 
and concentrated ownership, public firms with analyst followings can have higher 
cash holdings than their private counterparts due to information and monitoring 
effects.  All other variables are with expected sign.  Model 2 expands the sample 
to all public firms and includes a public-firm dummy equal to one when a public 
firm has no analyst coverage.  The regression estimates show striking evidence 
that not only do private firms hold less cash but so do public firms with no analyst 
coverage.  The F-test, used to examine the equality of the coefficients of these two 
dummies, rejects the null that these coefficients are equal, possibly because 
although these public firms have no coverage, they may be able to obtain a certain 
degree of transparency and supervision from other channels.  Most importantly, 
the difference in cash holdings between public and private firms demonstrates the 
economic importance and benefit of analyst coverage on the impact of firms’ cash 
holdings policies.  Given that the difference of mean in cash holdings between 
public and private firms from the univariate test is 10.2%, the regression estimate 
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indicates a company’s status can account for approximately 77% (65% if 
including the public-firm dummy) of this difference.  In an untabulated result, I 
include only public firms with analyst followings above the sample median, and 
reproduce the analysis as in Model 1.  The coefficient estimate of the private-firm 
dummy displays a greater discrepancy of cash holdings between public and 
private firms.  
Although the multiple regression tests have demonstrated that public firms 
with analyst coverage can have higher cash holdings, the extent to which firms 
might self-decide to stay private or go public is endogenous to some observable 
firm characteristics.  One plausible way to take account of this self-selection issue 
is to incorporate the propensity score matching methodology (e.g., Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd, 1997, and Smith and Todd, 2005).  The propensity score 
matching method computes the predicted value (probability) of being in the 
treatment group versus the control group (i.e., private or public firms) based on 
many observable determinants under the Probit model specification.  Therefore, I 
use this propensity score matching technique to calculate the probability of being 
private for each company based on the following model: 
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Table 5: Public and Private Firms and Going-Private Firms Analyses 
 
This table presents regression results and the average difference in cash holdings 
for US public and private companies from 2003–9.  A firm must have positive 
book value of total assets and positive sales to be included in the sample.  
Financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 
between 4900 and 4999) are excluded.  Except as noted, the dependent and 
independent variables are defined as in Table 1. Panel A presents regression 
estimates for the public and private firms’ sample.  Firms that go public or private 
are not included in the sample.  3-yr. Sales Growth is defined as three-year 
compound sales growth.  The private firm dummy equals one when a company’s 
status is private.  The public dummy equals one if public firms have no analyst 
coverage.  Panel B presents the average difference in cash holdings of public and 
private firms.  Cash holdings are cash plus marketable securities to the book value 
of assets (#1 / #6).  To evaluate the difference in cash holdings, I apply the 
propensity score method to control for various firm characteristics under the 
probit model.  The model is as follows: 
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The dependent variable is the private-firm dummy, which equals one if a firm’s 
status is private.  Log(sales) is the logarithm of sales plus one (#12).  Term 
premium is the difference of yield spreads between 10-year and 1-year treasury 
bonds at the fiscal year end.  Default premium is the difference of yield spreads 
between BBB and AAA corporate bonds at the fiscal year end.  The one-to-one 
estimator chooses for each private firm a public firm with the closest propensity 
score.  The nearest neighbor estimator chooses for each private firm the n (n = 10, 
25, and 50, respectively) public firms with the closest propensity scores and takes 
the arithmetic average of cash holdings for these public firms.  The Gaussian 
estimator uses all matched public firms for each private firm and takes the 
weighted average of cash holdings for these public firms.  The Gaussian estimator 
gives more weight to public firms with propensity scores that are closer to the 
corresponding private firm’s propensity score. The Epanechnikov estimator uses a 
weighted average approach similar to the Gaussian estimator but specifies the 
bandwidth = 0.01 to limit the number of matched public firms for each private 
firm.   Standard errors are in parentheses, calculated by bootstrapping with 50 
replications.  Panel C presents regression estimates for the going-private firms 
sample from 2001–7.  The post-private dummy equals one for the time period 
after going private.  Panel A includes industry and year fixed effects, and Panel C 
includes firm fixed effects.  T-stats, based on standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering, are in parentheses.  *** indicates 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.   
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Panel A. Effect of private status on the level of cash holdings 
 
Dependent variable: Cash / Assets  
 (1) 
Exclude zero coverage 
Public firms 
(2) 
Include zero coverage 
Public firms 
   
   
Private Firm Dummy -0.079*** -0.066*** 
 (-15.42) (-13.18) 
Public (zero coverage) Dummy  -0.042*** 
  (-8.30) 
3-yr. Sales Growth 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (3.72) (3.66) 
Industry Sigma 0.549*** 0.530*** 
 (4.81) (4.75) 
Firm Size -0.019*** -0.017*** 
 (-17.21) (-16.68) 
Cash Flow 0.025** 0.002 
 (2.15) (0.19) 
NWC -0.281*** -0.281*** 
 (-20.62) (-22.80) 
CAPX -0.391*** -0.404*** 
 (-13.52) (-14.77) 
Leverage -0.182*** -0.214*** 
 (-22.69) (-26.61) 
R&D 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (13.16) (14.93) 
Dividend Dummy -0.038*** -0.027*** 
 (-8.89) (-6.81) 
AQC -0.270*** -0.271*** 
 (-15.48) (-16.54) 
   
Observations 21,994 26,853 
Adjusted R-squared 0.524 0.493 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
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Panel B. Estimations from propensity score matching 
 
Estimator Difference in cash holdings 
(standard error) 
One-to-one -0.084*** 
 (0.010) 
Nearest neighbor (n=10) -0.077*** 
 (0.008) 
Nearest neighbor (n=25) -0.077*** 
 (0.007) 
Nearest neighbor (n=50) -0.066*** 
 (0.006) 
Gaussian -0.074*** 
 (0.007) 
Epanechnikov -0.081*** 
 (0.007) 
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Panel C. Effect of going private on the level of cash holdings  
 
Dependent variable: Cash / Assets 
 going-private firms 
  
Post-private Dummy -0.026** 
 (-2.32) 
Industry Sigma -0.758** 
 (-2.06) 
3-yr. Sales Growth -0.008*** 
 (-3.25) 
Firm Size -0.023*** 
 (-3.51) 
Cash Flow 0.286*** 
 (4.15) 
NWC -0.213*** 
 (-4.35) 
CAPX -0.150* 
 (-1.76) 
Leverage -0.082*** 
 (-3.59) 
R&D -0.230 
 (-0.46) 
Dividend Dummy 0.017 
 (1.37) 
AQC -0.006 
 (-0.19) 
  
Observations 316 
Adjusted R-squared 0.503 
Firm FE Yes 
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where the dependent variable is a private-firm dummy equal to one if a company 
is private.  Except where noted, all variables are defined as in Table 1.  Log(sales) 
is the logarithm of sales plus one.  3-yr sales growth is defined as three-year 
compound sales growth.  Term premium is the difference of yield spreads 
between 10-year and 1-year treasury bonds at the fiscal year end.  Default 
premium is the difference in yield spreads between BBB and AAA corporate 
bonds at the fiscal year end.  I also include industry fixed effects in the control.  
After obtaining the estimated probability of being private firm, I match each 
private firm with a set of public (non-private) firms with the closest propensity 
scores.  The one-to-one estimator selects for each private firm a public firm with 
the closest propensity score.  The nearest neighbor estimator selects for each 
private firm the n number of public firms with the closest propensity scores (n = 
10, 25, or 50).  The nearest neighbor estimator uses an arithmetic average of cash 
holdings from the n number of public firms.  The Gaussian estimator chooses for 
each private firm all public firms and takes a kernel-weighted average of cash 
holdings that gives more weight to public firms with closer propensity scores.  
The Epanechnikov uses a similar kernel-weighted average but specifies 
bandwidth equal to 0.01 to set an upper bound on the number of matched public 
firms.   In unreported tests, I also replace the bandwidth of 0.01 with 0.05 and 0.1 
and obtain similar results.  These various propensity score matching methods can 
mitigate the possible endogeneity concern arising from the observable firm 
characteristics.   
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Panel B reports the mean difference of cash holdings between private and 
public firms.  Across all different estimators, we can observe that private firms 
hold approximately 7.5% less cash than their matched public counterparts (the 
differences are significant at the 1% level, and standard errors are computed by 
bootstrapping with 50 replications).  These findings demonstrate the robustness of 
the findings from multiple regression tests in Panel A.  A potential concern of 
using the propensity score method is that an unobserved variable could 
simultaneously affect both being-private decision and cash holdings.  If the 
unobserved variable has such an effect, the results from the propensity score 
matching may have biased statistical inferences.  Hence, following Rosenbaum 
(2002), I employ a sensitivity analysis and find an unobserved variable is unlikely 
to alter the findings.19  Overall, given that analyst coverage reduces information 
asymmetry and its associated agency concerns, public firms can hoard more cash 
for their precautionary motives.  Lowered information asymmetry also lessens the 
cost of adverse selection.  Public firms can obtain more precautionary cash 
savings through equity financing from the market.  The findings from 
comparisons between public and private firms support the view that precautionary 
                                                 
19
 The essence of Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis is to understand the extent to 
which an unobserved factor could impair the inferences regarding the effect of the 
treatment on the outcome variable.  In other words, we would like to understand 
the likelihood an unobserved factor can simultaneously affect the assignment 
process of the treatment (being-private) and the outcome variable (cash holdings).  
If the assignment process of the treatment is endogenous, propensity score 
matching estimators are not consistent estimators. Hence, based on the sensitivity 
analysis, this helps us to reduce concerns about an unobserved factor might 
weaken the implications of matching results.  Results from Rosenbaum sensitivity 
analysis are available upon request. 
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motives can elicit a significant difference in cash holdings between public and 
private firms. 
 Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2008) show the level and change of 
information asymmetry can both lead to a time series effect on firms’ financing 
behaviors.  A firm’s decision to go private can not only increase the level of 
information asymmetry but induce a change in the severity of information 
asymmetry, which spurs a firm to use less information-sensitive alternatives.  
After firms go private, the cost of raising external capital related to the 
information sensitivity and more concentrated ownership will ultimately lead to 
higher cash holdings for going-private firms relative to when they were still 
public.  Hence I study cash holdings of going-private firms with analyst 
followings and look for a discrepancy in cash policy before and after the firms go 
private.  However, considering the impact of analysts’ information and 
monitoring effects on corporate cash policy, we would expect to see a lower level 
of cash holdings for firms after they go private, provided they received analyst 
coverage while public. 
 Following Borden and Yunis (2004) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010), I 
construct the going-private firms sample based on the legal definition from SEC.  
The SEC explains the legal definition of a going-private transaction as such: “If 
the transaction is initiated by an affiliate (an insider) of the company, or the 
company could be deemed to be making an acquisition of its own shares Rule 
13e-3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the affiliate and/or the 
company to file a Schedule 13E-3 with the SEC. When Rule 13e-3 applies, the 
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company is said to be “going private” under SEC rules…”.  Hence I search all 
SEC filings for forms SC 13E3, DEF13E3, and PRE13E3 to identify going-
private transactions.  To confirm the completion of these transactions, I search 
SEC filings for forms 15 and 25 (the certification of termination of security 
registration).  Finally, I use the CRSP security database to verify the sample firms 
are no longer available on the security’s exchanges.  Bharath and Dittmar (2010) 
explain that using CRSP as a verification procedure that can eliminate concerns 
about including firms that have “gone dark”.   As company financial information 
on Capital IQ is only available beginning in 2001, I retrieve all going-private 
firms’ information between 2000 and 2007.   The initial sample consists of the 
number of firms similar to what Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) report and 
similar to Bharath and Dittmar (2010), with some screening procedures.  After 
gathering all necessary information and excluding firms with no analyst following, 
the final sample consists of 316 firm-year observations with an average of 11 
years and 5 years in their public and private life, respectively.20  In the regression 
model, I include a post-private dummy equal to one for years after going private.  
I also include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. 
 Panel C of Table 5 shows the regression estimate of the post-private 
dummy is negative and significant.  Based on the estimated coefficient, firms 
                                                 
20
 Although Capital IQ collects private firms’ financial information from different 
resources, going-private firms must provide their financial information to the 
public through some channels for Capital IQ (or its data provider) to have access 
to it.  
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overall hold 2.6% less cash the period after going private.  The resulting estimate 
supports the hypotheses that although firms prefer internal financing after going 
private, which should result in higher cash reserves, firms with analyst followings 
can have relatively higher cash holdings during their public life.  In an 
untabulated result, I exclude the transitioning year when a firm moves from public 
to private.  The result is robust to this additional screening.  
 We have ascertained a positive relationship between analyst coverage and 
corporate cash policy and confirmed the extent and benefit of analyst coverage on 
the cash policies of public firms.  However, the positive relation is consistent with 
both the information and monitoring effect hypotheses of analysts.  Accordingly, 
in the following subsection, I employ the model from Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) who regress excess security returns on the change in cash and other control 
variables that would also affect the cash level to estimate the marginal value of 
cash.  This approach not only can identify the overall value-creation impact of 
analysts but can verify the significance of analysts’ information and monitoring 
effects. 
Analyst Following and the Value of Cash 
According to the information effect hypothesis, managers may hold cash 
for legitimate reasons such as precautionary motives.  Yet if such motives cannot 
be revealed fully to the market, investors will punish managers with lower firm 
valuation and may act to guard their own wealth.  Hence, if holding cash is costly, 
managers would prefer to distribute it through dividends or share repurchase.  
Analyst coverage can reduce the information asymmetry and enhance investor 
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cognizance of a firm.  If firm value is an increasing function of the breadth of 
investor cognizance, we would see overall firm value increase through the 
valuation of cash holdings.  Alternatively, based on the monitoring effect 
hypothesis developed in section 2, analysts can improve the efficient use of cash 
and constrain the misbehavior of managers, thereby increasing cash valuation. 
 Therefore, to gauge the value of analyst coverage on cash holdings, I 
follow Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) approach to estimate the marginal value of 
cash holdings, conditional on analyst coverage.  This method allows us evaluate 
the overall effect of analyst coverage on the valuation of corporate cash balances 
to shareholders.  If analysts act as information intermediaries and monitors, 
thereby positively impacting a firm, we would expect to see the value of cash 
increase with analyst coverage from shareholders’ point of view. The model is as 
follows: 
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where , is the stock return for firm i during fiscal year t and 3,B  is the matched 
portfolio return at year t based on Fama-French (1993) size and book-to-market 
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benchmark.21  
 denotes year fixed effects and 
 denotes industry fixed effects.  
The term ∆X indicates changes in the variable X.  The X variables include (AC) 
defined as analyst coverage; cash holdings (C) defined as cash plus marketable 
securities; earnings (E) defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus 
interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits; net assets (NA) defined 
as total assets minus cash, (I) as interest expense; (D) as dividend payment; 
financial leverage (L) defined as long-term debt plus short–term debt over long-
term debt plus short-term debt plus market value of equity; and net financing (NF) 
defined as total equity issuance minus repurchase plus debt issuance minus 
redemption.  To measure the marginal value of one additional dollar of cash 
holdings, both the dependent and the independent variables are standardized by 
lagged market value.  The coefficient of interest is , the regression estimate of 
the interaction term between change in cash and analyst coverage.   Based on the 
information and monitoring effect hypotheses, we would expect the coefficient of 
the interaction term to be positive.   
 Table 6 presents the regression results using Eq. (3).  Model 1 shows the 
result identical to Faulkender and Wang (2006) who argue larger cash holdings 
and a higher leverage ratio would lower the marginal value of cash.  According to 
the estimates in Model 1, an average firm with a leverage ratio of 22.5% and a 
cash level of 17.5% will have a marginal value of cash equal to $1.27 (1.862 – 
2.105 * 0.225 – 0.665 * 0.175).  Model 2 incorporates the analyst coverage (No. 
                                                 
21
 The size and book-to-market portfolio data are from Kenneth French’s website.  
I thank him for kindly providing the data.  Please also see Faulkender and Wang’s 
(2006) footnote 12 for details regarding the excess return computation. 
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of) into the regression.  The coefficient on the analyst coverage interacted with 
change in cash is significantly positive, which suggests that the monitoring and 
information intermediary functions of analysts increase overall firm value.  This 
evidence is consistent with Chung and Jo (1996) who find that the firm’s Tobin’s 
q increases with analysts’ monitoring as well as marketing functions.   
Model 3 instead incorporates analyst coverage (Deciles) into the 
regression.  The coefficient is 0.901 and significant at the 1% level.  Using 
coefficients from Model 3, the marginal value of cash for an average firm is worth 
$1.39.22  Yet if one considers moving from the lowest to the highest analyst 
coverage, the marginal value of cash increases from $0.93 to $1.83, which 
generates the difference of close to one dollar between the lowest and highest 
coverages.  This approximate one dollar difference suggests analyst coverage 
impacts a firm economically. 
   Further, in Model 4, I use a dummy variable to proxy for analyst 
coverage.  In particular, I define the analyst coverage dummy variable equal to 
one if the number of analysts covering a firm is higher than the sample median.  
The positive impact of analyst coverage on a firm’s cash valuation is robust to this 
alternative.  Using the coefficients of the interaction term between the change in 
                                                 
22
 (1.514 – 2.147 * 0.225 – 0.575 * 0.175 + 0.901 * 0.506) where 0.506 is the 
sample mean of analyst coverage as I transform deciles to the range from zero to 
one. 
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cash and analyst coverage from Model 4, one can find that a firm with the highest 
coverage has a value of cash worth approximately $1.73.23  
 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that firms with good governance in 
terms of managerial entrenchment or institutional block holdings could have 
positive impact on the marginal value of cash.  In models 5 and 6, in which we 
use an analyst coverage dummy, I first sort firms into terciles according to the G-
index and institutional block holdings, respectively.  Second, to be consistent with 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), I drop the middle governance group and set 
firms in the bottom tercile of the G-index and the top tercile of institutional block 
holdings equal to one. Thus the governance dummy variable equals one for the 
well-governed group in terms of the G-index and institutional block holdings.   I 
define the analyst coverage dummy in conjunction with these governance dummy 
variables.  Model 5 presents the regression estimates while controlling for 
institutional ownership holdings. As seen in Model 5, the coefficient on the 
institutional holdings interacted with change in cash holdings is negative, 
although not significantly different from zero.24  This finding is the reverse of that 
in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).  Although the finding may suggest some 
short-term incentive institutional shareholders induce the myopia behavior of 
managers, which outweighs the benefit from institutional investors’ monitoring 
                                                 
23
 In unreported results, I also set a dummy variable equal to one for firms with at 
least one analyst covering it.  The result still holds and confirms analyst coverage 
has a positive effect on cash holdings.  
 
24
 Liu and Mauer (2011) also report a negative coefficient on the interaction 
between change in cash and institutional block holdings. 
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(e.g., Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1992, and Bushee, 1998), the result may be 
due to different time periods and different sample selections.  Considering the 
regression result from Model 6, where I control for the G-index, the coefficient on 
the G-index interacted with the change in cash holdings is positive.  The positive 
coefficient on the G-index interacted with change in cash suggests well-governed 
firms have a higher marginal value of cash.25  Most importantly, the coefficients 
on the interaction between change in cash and analyst coverage stay the same 
through these two different model specifications.26 
  
                                                 
25
 The results stay similar when keeping the middle governance group.   
 
26
 In untabulated results, I include the G-index and institutional block holdings in 
models 2 and 3, and the results are robust to these alternative specifications.  I 
also replace institutional block holdings with total institutional holdings or 
pension fund holdings, and the results are generally similar.  Also, when 
controlling for firm fixed effects, the results are qualitatively consistent.    
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Table 6. The Marginal Value of Cash with Analyst Coverage 
 
This table presents regression results of , A  3,B  on analyst coverage and 
changes in firm characteristics over the whole sample period.  Model 1, the 
baseline regression following Faulkender and Wang (2006), includes Cash (Ct), 
Earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and 
investment tax credits (Et), Net assets (NAt, total assets minus cash), R&D (RDt), 
Interest expenses (It), Common dividends paid (Dt), Leverage (Lt, long-term debt 
plus short-term debt over long-term debt plus short–term debt plus market value 
of equity), and Net financing (NFt, total equity issuance minus repurchase plus 
debt issuance minus redemption).  All variables excluding analyst coverage, Inst. 
Block Holdings, G index, leverage, and excess return have been deflated by the 
lagged market value of equity of the firm.  Model 2 includes analyst coverage (No. 
of) defined as the logarithm of the number of analysts following plus one in the 
regression.  Model 3 includes analyst coverage deciles (Deciles) in the regression.  
Model 4 includes dummy coverage (Dummy) in the regression.  Dummy equals 
one for firms with analyst coverage above the sample median each year.  Models 
5 and 6 include institutional block holdings and the G-index as controls, 
respectively.  I first split sample into terciles based on institutional block holdings 
and G-index, separately.  The middle tercile is dropped from the analysis.  Second, 
I define governance dummy equal to one for firms in the top tercile of 
institutional block holdings and the bottom tercile of G-index.  ∆ indicates the 
change from the previous year.  The subscript t-1 and t indicate the value of the 
variable is at the beginning or the end of fiscal year t.  All variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percentiles to mitigate the impact of extreme 
outliers.  All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.  T-stats, based on 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering, are in 
parentheses.  *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  
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Dependent variable: excess return , A  3,B  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     Control for 
Inst. Block 
Holdings  
Control 
for 
G index 
  Coverage Defined As:    
 FW Analyst 
 Coverage 
(No. of) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Deciles) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Dummy)  
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Dummy) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
(Dummy) 
       
Coverage  0.009*** 0.035*** 0.009** 0.020*** -0.013 
  (4.82) (5.20) (2.40) (4.30) (-1.45) 
∆Ct * Coverage  0.274*** 0.901*** 0.525*** 0.534*** 0.429* 
  (9.72) (8.37) (7.06) (5.89) (1.91) 
Inst. Holdings     -0.025***  
     (-5.25)  
∆Ct * Inst. Block 
Holdings 
    -0.104 
(-1.57) 
 
      
G index      -0.032*** 
      (-3.76) 
∆Ct * G index      0.530*** 
      (3.14) 
∆Ct 1.862*** 1.628*** 1.514*** 1.791*** 1.804*** 1.472*** 
 (36.70) (28.46) (22.88) (33.63) (26.22) (6.67) 
∆Et 0.464*** 0.464*** 0.464*** 0.465*** 0.448*** 0.536*** 
 (28.37) (28.68) (28.55) (28.44) (23.95) (9.27) 
∆NAt 0.219*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 0.198*** 
 (23.59) (23.58) (23.50) (23.49) (20.41) (6.88) 
∆RDt 0.238 0.182 0.187 0.219 0.134 0.684 
 (1.43) (1.10) (1.13) (1.31) (0.68) (1.24) 
∆It -1.877*** 
(-14.24) 
-1.884*** 
(-14.36) 
-1.886*** 
(-14.34) 
-1.885*** 
(-14.30) 
-1.851*** 
(-12.30) 
-1.907*** 
(-3.60) 
∆Dt 1.731*** 1.760*** 1.731*** 1.729*** 2.027*** 2.654*** 
 (5.79) (5.90) (5.80) (5.78) (5.99) (4.09) 
NFt 0.036** 0.030* 0.031* 0.035** 0.029 -0.167*** 
 (1.98) (1.69) (1.72) (1.97) (1.37) (-2.62) 
Ct-1 0.396*** 0.406*** 0.408*** 0.402*** 0.386*** 0.378*** 
 (22.02) (22.62) (22.62) (22.19) (18.70) (5.99) 
∆Ct * Ct-1 -0.665*** 
(-8.72) 
-0.593*** 
(-7.78) 
-0.575*** 
(-7.49) 
-0.613*** 
(-7.95) 
-0.611*** 
(-6.85) 
-0.641** 
(-2.14) 
Lt -0.575*** 
(-56.15) 
-0.569*** 
(-54.99) 
-0.568*** 
(-54.87) 
-0.572*** 
(-55.34) 
-0.565*** 
(-46.68) 
-0.521*** 
(-17.99) 
∆Ct * Lt -2.105*** 
(-19.44) 
-2.069*** 
(-19.19) 
-2.147*** 
(-19.93) 
-2.110*** 
(-19.50) 
-2.079*** 
(-16.07) 
-1.435*** 
(-3.03) 
 
       
Observations 95,218 95,218 95,218 95,218 64,570 12,260 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.228 0.231 0.231 0.229 0.229 0.208 
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Information and Monitoring Effects 
I develop further evidence on the effect of analysts on the level and 
incremental value of cash holdings, based first on the information hypothesis and 
then the monitoring effect hypothesis.  In particular, according to the information 
effect hypothesis, analysts work as information intermediaries that collect and 
disseminate information on behalf of investors, which results in an enhanced 
information environment, thereby leading to a more pronounced information 
effect for firms with greater information asymmetry.  Hence we would expect 
analysts’ influence on the level of cash and the resulting additional marginal value 
of cash to be greater when the information asymmetry is higher.  Accordingly, to 
examine the impact of analyst coverage on firms’ cash holdings under varied 
information asymmetry, I first incorporate an interaction term between analyst 
coverage and R&D based on Eq. (1) (the cash holdings model following Bates et 
al. (2009)).  Second, I sort firms into two subgroups based on the sample median 
of R&D each year to estimate the marginal value of cash for both subgroups.27  
Further, according to the monitoring hypothesis, analysts’ monitoring function 
will be more valuable for firms with greater self-dealing possibilities.28  
                                                 
27
 I also use the Amihud illiquidity measure and bid-ask spread as alternative 
proxies for information asymmetry.  The results are qualitatively similar to the 
results that follow. 
 
28
 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) show that dual-class firms could suffer 
from greater agency costs.  Hence, in untabulated results, I separate firms based 
on the dual-class status.  I obtain qualitatively similar results in which the 
marginal value of cash associated with analyst coverage is higher for dual-class 
firms.  I also use excess cash level and the number of independent directors as 
alternative proxies for agency conflict and obtain the same conclusion. 
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Consequently, I include an interaction term between analyst coverage and the G-
index in the cash holdings model.  Then I sort firms into two subgroups based on 
the sample median of the G-index each year to estimate the marginal value of 
cash for both subgroups.  The high G-index group (firms whose G-index value is 
above the sample median) refers to the subgroup with high potential agency 
conflict. 
With regard to the information effect hypothesis, Panel A of Table 7 
presents the regression result of the coefficient on the interaction term between 
analyst coverage and R&D.  The positive coefficient (significant at the 1% level) 
indicates analyst coverage has greater influence on the cash policy when the 
information asymmetry is higher.  Panel B of Table 7 provides the regression 
estimates from estimating the marginal value of cash.  With the highest analyst 
coverage, the value of cash reserves increases by an additional $1.043 ($0.524) 
for the high (low) information asymmetry subgroup.  When testing the equality of 
coefficients between these two subgroups, the z statistic is 5.83, which rejects the 
null hypothesis that the difference of the coefficients is zero (at the 5% 
significance level).  These findings, based on the results from the level and value 
of cash regression, support the view of analysts’ information effect.   
In Panel C, using the G-index as a proxy for potential agency conflict, I 
present the regression estimates based on the cash holdings model.  The positive 
coefficient (significant at the 5% level) on the interaction term between analyst 
coverage and the G-index confirms the impact of analyst coverage on cash 
holdings increases with agency conflict.  In Panel D, by estimating the marginal 
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value of cash, I provide the regression results.  With the highest analyst coverage, 
analysts can increase the marginal value of cash by an additional $1.813 and 
$0.824 for the high and low agency conflict subgroups.  The Wald test also rejects 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of these two interaction terms are equal, 
which validates the monitoring hypothesis. 
Given that analysts can have a greater impact on cash holdings and 
generate a higher marginal value of cash from the higher information asymmetry 
or the higher agency conflict subgroup, the findings confirm the analysts’ 
information and monitoring effect hypotheses.  In addition, based on previous 
findings that suggest analyst coverage has an overall positive impact on firm 
value through increased cash valuation, we confirm shareholders can recognize 
the value created from analysts’ activities. 
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Table 7. Information and Monitoring Effects 
 
Panel A and B present the regression results based on the information effect 
hypothesis using ratio of R&D to sales as a proxy for information asymmetry.  
Specifically, Panel A presents the results using the cash holdings model following 
Bates et al. (2009).  Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), Panel B presents 
regression results of , A  3,B  on analyst coverage and changes in firm 
characteristics for two subgroups based on the ratio of R&D to sales.  Panel C and 
D present the regression results based on the monitoring effect hypothesis using 
the G-index as a proxy for potential agency conflict.  Specifically, Panel C 
presents results using the cash holdings model following Bates et al. (2009).  
Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), Panel D presents the regression results 
of , A  3,B  on analyst coverage and changes in firm characteristics for two 
subgroups based on the G index.   For Panel A and C, the dependent and 
independent variables are defined as in Table 1.  Control variables are subtracted 
from the table for brevity.  For Panel B and D, firms are separated into two 
subgroups based on the sample median each year based on the ratio of R&D to 
sales and the G-index as proxies for information asymmetry and potential agency 
conflict, respectively.  All variables (defined as in Table 6) excluding analyst 
coverage, leverage, and excess return have been deflated by the lagged market 
value of equity of the firm.  Control variables are subtracted from the table for 
brevity.  ∆ indicates the change from the previous year.  The last column of panels 
B and D presents the χ statistics (p-value in parentheses) from the Wald test for 
testing the equality of coefficients of ∆Ct*Coverage of two subgroups.  All 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percentiles to mitigate the impact 
of extreme outliers.  All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.  T-
stats, based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and firm-level 
clustering, are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at1%, ** at 5%, and * at 
10%. 
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Panel A. Information effect based on R&D – the level of cash 
 
Dependent variable: Cash / Assets 
 Analyst 
Coverage 
(Decile) 
  
Coverage 0.047*** 
 (11.14) 
Coverage * R&D 0.026*** 
 (5.31) 
R&D 0.014*** 
 (6.45) 
  
Controls Same as specification (1), Table 2 
Observations 94,636 
Adjusted R-squared 0.512 
 
 
Panel B. Information effect based on R&D – the marginal value of cash 
 
 (1) (2)  
 Low 
information 
asymmetry 
High 
information 
asymmetry 
 
βH - βL= 0 
    
∆Ct 1.296*** 1.655***  
 (29.60) (32.53)  
Coverage 0.035*** 0.040***  
 (3.91) (3.90)  
∆Ct * Coverage 0.524*** 1.043*** 5.83 
 (6.34) (11.71) (0.02) 
    
Controls Same as specification (1), 
Table 6 
 
Observations 48,868 46,349  
Adj. R-squared 0.221 0.256  
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Panel C. Monitoring effect based on the G-index – the level of cash 
 
Dependent variable: Cash / Assets 
 Analyst 
Coverage 
(Decile) 
  
Coverage 0.006 
 (0.27) 
Coverage * G-index 0.005** 
 (2.20) 
G-index -0.007*** 
 (-3.49) 
  
Controls Same as specification (1), Table 2 
Observations 19,966 
Adjusted R-squared 0.565 
 
 
Panel D. Monitoring effect based on the G-index – the marginal value of cash 
 
 (1) (2)  
 Low 
agency 
conflict 
High 
agency 
conflict 
 
βH - βL= 0 
    
∆Ct 1.795*** 0.139  
 (12.99) (0.90)  
Coverage 0.024 -0.006  
 (1.12) (-0.27)  
∆Ct * Coverage 0.824*** 1.813*** 3.19 
 (4.45) (9.26) (0.07) 
    
Controls Same as specification (1), Table 6  
Observations 11,363 8,663  
Adj. R-squared 0.231 0.204  
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Chapter 5 
CASH ACCUMULATION, DISSIPATION, AND NONLINEARITY EFFECTS  
The Accumulation and Dissipation of Excess Cash and Its Valuation 
Excess cash, defined as the cash reserves not required for investments, 
operations, and possible hedging purposes, is subject to potential agency conflict.  
Given weak governance mechanisms, managers could build up excess cash 
reserves and dissipate them quickly under certain forms of self-benefiting 
activities (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).  Harford (1999) shows cash-rich firms 
tend to engage in value-destroying acquisitions.  Similarly, Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2008) find poorly governed firms squander cash easily through 
acquisitions and capital expenditures, and the likelihood of spending increases 
with excess cash.  As a result, one would expect investors’ valuation of firms’ 
cash holdings to be lower for firms with higher level of excess cash.  Based on 
various perspectives of shareholders’ protection, Pinkowits, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2006), Dittmar and Marht-Smith (2007), and Fresard and Salva(2010) 
show the value of cash (excess cash) increases with the quality of governance.   
Accordingly, similar to Dittmar and Marht-Smith (2007), to better assess 
the monitoring effect of analysts, I first study the impact of analysts on firms’ 
accumulation and dissipation of excess cash.  Second, I re-estimate the marginal 
value of an additional dollar in cash that is associated with excess cash, and see 
how analysts’ monitoring interacts with it. 
I define excess cash as the portion of cash reserves held by firms that is 
above the predicted level based on the precautionary and transaction cost model 
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(Eq. 1).  Specifically, I perform Fama-MacBeth regression using Eq. 1 and obtain 
the predicted level of cash holdings based on the average coefficients.  The 
residual, constructed as actual cash holdings minus predicted cash holdings, is 
excess cash holdings.29  I retain only firms with positive excess cash in any given 
year, as such firms could suffer from greater potential agency conflict, which 
could lead to a significant impact from the monitoring effect.  Panel A in Table 8 
shows the results on how analyst coverage at time t-1 affects the change in excess 
cash from time t-1 to t.  I include the industry’s average change in excess cash to 
control for possible industry-wide variation on factors that could affect the 
change.30   
In the first model, the coefficient on the analyst coverage is negative and 
significant at the 1% level.  This result suggests analysts, through enhancing a 
corporate governance structure, can prohibit managers from accumulating too 
much excess cash, which could lower the propensity of self-dealing.  To gauge 
the magnitude of analysts’ monitoring effect, the second model replaces the 
number of analysts with analyst coverage deciles.  The results suggest that with 
the highest coverage, the change in excess cash decreases by an economically 
large 24% (0.006 / 0.025). 
                                                 
29
 In untabulated results, I perform different measures of excess cash such as 
including firm fixed effects in the calculation or using a logarithm of cash/net 
assets as cash ratio.  I also perform a 10-year rolling regression to obtain the 
average coefficients to allow for the possibility of time-varying effects on the 
determinants.  The results are robust under these different model specifications. 
 
30
 In untabulated results, I also include firm fixed effects to mitigate the omitted 
variable concern.  The results are robust to this model specification.  Further, 
when I include firms with negative excess cash, the results remain robust. 
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Figure 2 shows the impact of analysts on firms’ dissipation of excess cash.  
I again include only firms with positive excess cash and then separate firms into 
two groups based on whether they are covered by at least one analyst.  I define 
firms with positive excess cash in a given year as year 0, and examine the time-
series pattern of the use of excess cash over the next five years.  In particular, I 
compute the ratio of excess cash at t+n as the amount of excess cash at t+n 
divided by the amount of excess cash at t  (year 0), where n ranges from 1 to 5.  
The result is consistent with the monitoring effect hypothesis.  A median 
firm covered by analysts holds more excess cash in the following years, whereas a 
median firm without coverage squanders its excess cash more rapidly.  The 
difference between these two groups in each year is significant at the 1% level. 
Overall, the results demonstrate analysts’ ability to deter managers from 
holding and spending excess cash to pursue private benefits.  Given that this 
excess portion of cash exhibits a greater probability of agency conflict, the 
marginal value of cash should decrease when firms’ excess cash reserves increase, 
which leads to a negative coefficient on the interaction between change in cash 
and the amount of excess cash.  However, if analysts serve as monitors in 
detecting managers’ rent-seeking, the negative impact of excess cash on the 
marginal value of cash should be mitigated as the number of analysts increases.   
To investigate this conjecture, I incorporate the three-way interaction term in the 
model based on Model 3.31 
                                                 
31
 I also apply the value regression model similar to Fama-French (1998) to 
examine the impact of analysts’ monitoring on the value of excess cash, while 
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Table 8, Panel B, Model 1 uses excess cash dummy which equals one if a 
firm’s excess cash is above the sample median.  As shown in the panel, the 
regression coefficient on the interaction term between change in cash and excess 
cash is negative and significant.  This finding suggests that due to possible agency 
conflicts, investors place a discount on the value of cash holdings when firms hold 
a sizeable amount of excess cash.  In addition, the positive coefficient (significant 
at the 1% level) on the interaction term between change in cash, excess cash, and 
coverage suggests that given analysts’ monitoring aligning the interests of a 
manager and outside shareholders, the negative impact of excess cash on the 
marginal value of cash will be reduced.  This finding suggests that firms can 
manage excess cash more efficiently when a stronger governance mechanism is 
present.  In Model 2, I take only firms with positive excess cash in a given year 
and rerun the analysis.  The results remain robust under this model specification.   
  
                                                                                                                                     
controlling for other variables that could affect firm valuation.  The results are 
robust under this setting as well as under different measures of excess cash. 
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Table 8. The Accumulation of Excess Cash and Its Associated Valuation 
 
The following panels present the results on the impact of analysts on the 
accumulation of excess cash and its valuation.  Excess cash is the residual based 
on the average coefficients from the Fama-MacBeth regression using equation 1 
without analyst coverage.  Panel A presents the results of analysts’ impact on 
firms’ accumulation of excess cash.  All firms must have positive excess cash in 
year t to be considered in the sample.  The dependent variable is the change in the 
excess cash ratio from year t-1 to t.  Independent variables including industry 
average change in excess cash and analyst coverage are in year t-1.  All variables 
excluding analyst coverage are deflated by book value of assets.  Model 1 and 
Model 2 use Analyst coverage (No. of) and Analyst coverage (Decile) as 
coverage, defined as the logarithm of the number of analysts plus one and the 
deciles of analyst coverage, respectively.  Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), 
Panel B presents the regression results of , A  3,B  on analyst coverage, excess 
cash, and changes in firm characteristics.  All variables (defined as in Table 6) 
excluding analyst coverage, excess cash, leverage, and excess return have been 
deflated by the lagged market value of equity of the firm.  In Model 1, ExCash is 
an indicator variable which equals one if a firm’s excess cash is above the sample 
median.  Model 2 keeps only firms with positive excess cash at time t.  Control 
variables are subtracted from the table for brevity.  For both panels, ∆ indicates 
the change from the previous year.  All variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1 percentile to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers.  T-stats, based on 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering, are in 
parentheses.  *** indicates significance at1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
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Panel A. Accumulation of excess cash 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ExcessCasht   
 Coverage 
(No. of) 
Coverage 
(Deciles) 
   
Coveraget-1 -0.002*** -0.006*** 
 (-5.06) (-4.19) 
Ind. Average change in excess casht 0.841*** 0.838*** 
 (27.63) (27.57) 
Constant -0.003*** -0.002* 
 (-2.88) (-1.81) 
   
Observations 33,729 33,729 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042 0.042 
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Panel B. The marginal value of cash and excess cash 
 
Dependent variable: : excess return , A  3,B   
 (1) (2) 
 Coverage 
(Deciles) 
Coverage 
(Deciles) 
   
∆Ct 1.899*** 1.930*** 
 (39.24) (34.26) 
Coverage 0.034*** 0.067*** 
 (3.21) (4.60) 
ExCash -0.215*** -1.320*** 
 (-25.27) (-24.09) 
∆Ct*Coverage 0.726*** 0.443*** 
 (4.88) (4.15) 
∆Ct*ExCash -0.181*** -1.705*** 
 (-3.79) (-6.83) 
ExCash*Coverage 0.046*** 0.225** 
 (2.98) (2.38) 
∆Ct*ExCash*Coverage 0.476*** 4.897*** 
 (2.82) (9.15) 
   
Controls Same as specification (1), Table 6 
Observations 62,501 41,773 
Adjusted R-squared 0.248 0.321 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Uncovered 0.71 0.49 0.35 0.22 0.13 
Covered 0.76 0.59 0.46 0.36 0.27 
z-statistics (-5.929***) (-6.39***) (-5.302***) (-4.531***) (-3.843***) 
 
Figure 2.  Firms’ Dissipation of Excess Cash by Analyst Coverage 
 
This figure presents the time-series change in excess cash of a median firm over 
five years. Excess cash is the residual based on the average coefficients from the 
Fama-MacBeth regression using equation 1 without analyst coverage.  All firms 
must have positive excess cash in year t to be considered in the sample.  The 
percentage of excess cash left is the ratio of the excess cash level held by a 
median firm in year t over the excess cash level in year 0, where t = 1 – 5.  The 
figure separates firms into two groups based on whether they are covered by at 
least one analyst.  The bottom row reports the z-stat based on Wilcoxon’s rank 
sum test for the difference in medians between the first two rows.  ***, **, and * 
indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Nonlinearity Impact of Analysts  
The OLS regression assumes cash holdings are a linear function of analyst 
coverage and other control variables which suggests the marginal impact of 
analysts is constant.  However, it might be plausible to infer that there exists a 
nonlinear relationship between cash holdings and analyst coverage, given the 
benefits of adding more analysts could be diminished when a firm has been 
covered by a considerable number of analysts.   
To test this conjecture, I employ coverage dummy for each decile to 
examine the marginal effect of each.  Table 9 reports the regression estimates for 
each decile.  As shown in the table, there is a hump-shaped relation between cash 
holdings and analyst coverage.  The impact of analyst coverage reaches its 
maximum at the sixth decile group.  This finding supports the nonlinearity impact 
of analysts on cash holdings.  Although given its hump-shaped relation with cash 
holdings, the analysts’ impact is considered economically significant.  For 
example, when switching from zero coverage to the first decile group and the 
sixth decile group, cash holdings can increase by 1.6% (10% of the sample mean)  
and 4.5% (28%) , respectively.32   
                                                 
32
 0.016 / 0.162 = 10% and 0.045 / 0.162 = 28%, given the average cash ratio is 
0.162 for zero coverage group. 
 85 
Table 9. Results on the Nonlinearity Impact of Analysts 
 
This table presents regression results for all U.S. companies from 1984–2009.  A 
firm must have positive book value of total assets and positive sales to be 
included in the sample.  Financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and 
utility firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) are excluded. Except as noted, 
the dependent variable and independent variables are defined as in Table 1.  
Coverage(*) is an indicator variable which equals one if a firm is in the * decile 
group of a given year, where * = 1 - 9.  All regressions include industry and year 
fixed effects.  All ratio variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 
percentiles.  T-stats, based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
firm-level clustering, are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at 0.1%, ** at 
1%, and * at 5%. 
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Dependent variable: Cash / Assets  
 
 Coverage 
(Decile dummies) 
  
Industry Sigma 0.507*** 
 (7.35) 
M/B 0.015*** 
 (19.15) 
Firm Size -0.011*** 
 (-12.63) 
Cash Flow -0.060*** 
 (-8.78) 
NWC -0.305*** 
 (-42.50) 
CAPX -0.362*** 
 (-27.32) 
Leverage -0.349*** 
 (-54.09) 
R&D 0.024*** 
 (18.58) 
Dividend Dummy -0.023*** 
 (-8.82) 
AQC -0.233*** 
 (-26.35) 
Coverage(1) 0.016*** 
 (5.74) 
Coverage(2) 0.022*** 
 (7.85) 
Coverage(3) 0.032*** 
 (10.81) 
Coverage(4) 0.037*** 
 (12.32) 
Coverage(5) 0.042*** 
 (13.47) 
Coverage(6) 0.045*** 
 (13.81) 
Coverage(7) 0.043*** 
 (12.25) 
Coverage(8) 0.033*** 
 (8.54) 
Coverage(9) 0.020*** 
 (4.24) 
  
Observations 94,636 
Adjusted R-squared 0.512 
Year FE Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
The literature provides inconclusive evidence on the economic importance 
of analysts’ activities for the firm.  Previous work has relied on the study of stock 
performance to provide support on how analysts’ information, under the context 
of earnings forecasts and recommendations, drives outside investors’ behavior, 
which affects the stock price.  However, the conflicts of interest resulting from 
various perspectives of analysts’ career concerns may reduce the validity of 
analysts’ opinions.  In addition, research concerning analysts’ monitoring function 
and how this function affects firm behavior is limited.  In other words, do analysts 
have a direct impact on corporate policies in terms of acting as information 
intermediaries and monitors?  Second, how do shareholders perceive the impact 
of analysts’ activities on corporate policies?  Do shareholders recognize the value 
of the functions analysts provide?  This paper aims to answer these questions by 
examining the relation between analyst coverage and corporate cash policy and 
the value of cash.  Specifically, by studying how analysts’ information 
intermediary and monitoring functions affect corporate cash holdings, this paper 
contributes to an understanding of the relation between corporate cash policy and 
the variation of information asymmetry and its associated potential agency 
concern. 
The findings are three-fold.  First, I find that cash holdings increase with 
analyst coverage.  This positive effect can be explained by both the monitoring 
and information intermediary functions of analysts.  In particular, analysts’ close 
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scrutinization of managers can increase the overall efficient allocation of assets 
and enhance the alignment of managers’ and outside shareholders’ interests.  
Therefore, analysts’ monitoring will result in a positive relation between cash 
holdings and analyst coverage.   Analysts’ broadcast of information lowers 
information asymmetry, thereby increasing firm value through cash holdings.  
With higher firm valuation and ease of access to the external market because of 
reduced information asymmetry, firms will be able to increase their cash holdings 
for legitimate reasons such as precautionary cash reserves.  Thus the information 
intermediary function of analysts also contributes to a positive relationship.   
Second, this paper takes a set of various steps toward addressing the 
potential endogeneity issue as described by analyst literature.  The observable 
firm characteristics or a potential common unobservable factor could 
simultaneously affect cash holdings and analyst coverage, producing biased 
estimations and incorrect statistic inferences.  I first use the techniques including a 
two-stage least squares method, and a lagged-values method to account for this 
endogeneity possibility.  In addition, I study the effect of a change in analyst 
coverage on a change in cash holdings and incorporate the experiment related to 
the effect of post-Regulation Fair Disclosure on analysts to confirm the robustness 
of the positive relationship between cash holdings and analyst coverage.   
By using a unique dataset that comprises a set of public and private firms, 
I strengthen the evidence by examining the extent and economic significance of 
the impact of analyst coverage on corporate cash policy.   I also incorporate a 
novel experiment of going-private firms and find that firms hold relatively more 
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cash during their public life than during their private life.   All of the findings 
provide direct evidence that information and monitoring have a direct impact on 
corporate cash policy. 
Third, by estimating the marginal value of an additional dollar in cash 
associated with analyst coverage, I find strong support that, in general, analyst 
coverage increases the marginal value of cash holdings, which suggests analysts 
generally create value for the firm.  I further analyze the impact of the monitoring 
and information intermediary functions of analysts under the framework of 
subgroup tests.  In particular, I segregate firms into two subgroups based first on 
the level of information asymmetry and then on potential agency conflict.  I find 
the impact of analysts is more pronounced under the environment with higher 
information asymmetry as well as higher agency conflict.  The results confirm 
shareholders do recognize the economic significance of the information 
intermediary and monitoring functions of analysts. 
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